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FASTER: THE FAULT TOLERANT ARCHITECTURE SIMULATION TOOL FOR EVALUATING RELIABILITY, INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATIONS

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FASTER: THE FAULT TOLERANT ARCHITECTURE SIMULATION TOOL FOR EVALUATING RELIABILITY, INTRODUCTION AND APPLICATIONS

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Executive Summary

FASTER (Fault Tolerant Architecture Simulation Tool for Evaluating Reliability) provides a flexible method for simulation of complex reconfigurable systems subject to different mission phases. This report describes the following: 1) Method of representation for complex systems, 2) Editors used to enter system representation, 3) FASTER simulation method and 4) Examples.

FASTER was developed to describe complex systems which can not be easily addressed with analytical techniques. The unique features of FASTER are the method of representation and the constraint directed editor.

FASTER is written in FORTRAN and can run on a VAX series computer.

1 Introduction

This report describes technical features of the FASTER simulation package. The concepts used in the design of FASTER are discussed. Also, because FASTER deals with complex reconfigurable systems, a method and approach for effective system representation is presented. This representation method is needed because more traditional methods such as analytical techniques which combine subsystem MTBFs to obtain an overall MTBF (or combine other quantities such as availability or reliability) are not able to easily deal with complex reconfigurable systems. A clear understanding of this representation method is needed to properly use FASTER.

The report is divided into the following sections:

- 2.0 Representation of Complex Reconfigurable Systems
- 3.0 Constraint Directed Editor
- 4.0 FASTER Engine
- 5.0 Modeling Capabilities-Examples

Each of the above sections provide background for the FASTER user. Further details and examples on how to use FASTER are provided in the FASTER User's Guide.

2 Representation of Complex Reconfigurable Systems

Existing methods for computing reliability characteristics of fault tolerance systems are effective for simple systems. There are analytical techniques for computing failure rates of simple series and parallel systems. However, when the system can reconfigure by changing its internal state or use of reallocation of resources, the analytical methods quickly become overly complex and almost impossible to solve in closed form. Furthermore, complex systems performance is typically dependent on the mission. The ability of the system to successfully complete its mission is the important question instead of what is the failure rate.

2.1 Need for a Mission Level Simulation

For a complex system which can adapt in response to internal failures, the important question is:

Can the system complete its intended mission?

This is in contrast to the normal measures (such as failure rates) which are used for simple systems. For this reason, the environment (or mission) of the complex system needs to be described. Many missions place time dependent loads or demands on the system. This has two effects:

- 1. Stress levels placed upon the system change.
- 2. System performance requirements change.

Both of these effects must be considered in the evaluation of complex systems. Different stress levels change the MTBF of various subsystems and cause failures to be correlated with different mission phases. Time varying requirements imposed by the mission require different levels of system availability. For these reasons, the FASTER system has a "mission block" which is used to specify time dependent scenarios which "drive" the system simulation.

The mission block can be used to represent times when certain resources are needed. Also, the mission defines what function the system must conduct. The success of the system is dependent on the coincidence of having the right resource at the right time. If resources are unavailable during periods when they are not needed, then the mission may still be successful.

2.2 System Representation

Complex systems are composed of multiple interacting subsystems. The interaction between subsystems determines how the overall system functions. Also, complex systems, subject to failure and other changes in condition, must be described by a dynamic process. At any instant in time, the system can be described by a state. The overall state of the system is a function of the states (or modes) of the subsystems. The mode of a subsystem determines its ability to function. For example, if a subsystem is in a failure state, the subsystem "output" may not have the desired responses to other systems "input". Other subsystems may not be able to perform their function because of the interaction with the

failed subsystem. That is, subsystems which have not failed may still not be operational because they do not have the required inputs.


To deal with subsystem interactions and effects of different subsystem modes, FASTER represents complex systems by using a state transition diagram and high level "functional" transfer functions associated with each node (or state or mode) in the state transition diagram. Figure 1 shows how a system is represented as a set of interconnected subsystems. Note that each subsystem has a mode and each mode has an associated functional transfer function. The combination of state transitions and functional transfer functions form the basic unit of subsystem representation in FASTER. This type of subsystem is referred to as a primitive.

A complex system can be composed of many primitives which interact through connections or interfaces.

The above representation method was chosen to allow FASTER to describe complex reconfigurable system behavior; some features of this representation are:

- 1. The number of system modes is given by a product of the numbers of subsystem modes. This makes it impractical to construct an overall system state diagram in many cases. The FASTER representation method allows the user to partition the system into interacting subsystems. An overall state transition diagram is not entered by the user, instead, state transition diagrams for each subsystem are entered. For a system composed of 10 subsystems having 5 modes/subsystems an overall state diagram would have 5**10 modes because of combinatorial effects. However, if 5 diagrams with 10 modes each are used to represent the system, the user only needs enter 50 modes each instead of one diagram with 9,765,625 modes which would be required if one transition diagram was used to describe the system.
- 2. The use of "functional" transfer functions allows the interactions between subsystems to be described in terms of input resources and output resources. Subsystems may not be able to perform their function if they do not receive the proper input resources from other subsystems. This feature allows a "richer" description of subsystem interoperability and a relation to a mission scenario.
- 3. The description allows "feedback" from one system to another. Feedback is required if a system is self reconfigurable. Also FASTER can account for the effect of imperfect Built-in-Test (BIT) and switching. Certain primitives which act as monitors (BIT) and control switches can be defined and used to describe reconfigurable systems. Feedback is involved when monitor output is used to cause reconfiguration.

REPRESENTATION



Each subsystem has a mode graph and each mode in the mode graph has a functional transfer function.

Figure 1: FASTER Representation

4. Unlike the analytical approach, a FASTER model closely relates to the systems being simulated. This makes it easier for the user to understand the modeling process and see how the relationships between subsystems impact overall system performance.

The representation method requires a system engineering approach. To use FASTER properly, the interactions between subsystems must be understood by the FASTER user. The FASTER editors allow users to define primitives and describe subsystem interactions without using a specialized computer language. Figure 2 is an illustration of the types of data needed in a FASTER simulation. A brief description of the data is presented in figure 2. Further details can be obtained from the users guide as well as in section 5.

2.3 System Performance Measures

Traditional measures used include Mean Time Between Failure (MTBF), Mean Time Between Critical Failure (MTBCF), Mean Time to Repair (MTTR), availability and reliability. In a simple system only one value for each of the above measures is needed. However, for complex systems, there may be several numbers or values which relate to each of the above measures. For example a complex system which performs multiple functions may have a MTBCF for each function. Furthermore, each of the above measures must be extended or generalized. For example, MTBF, MTBCF and MTTR can be extended to Mean Time Between Transition. This extension is required because there may be several failure modes involved in a complex system. In some cases, the meaning of "failure" must be defined. For a complex system, the failure of subcomponents is not the prime quantity of interest. Instead, the quantity of interest is the failure of the system to perform mission objectives. Individual subcomponent failures may still be of interest to system designers who must determine the required redundancy.

For highly complex systems, the user can use the "test probe" approach to obtain statistics for only selected subsystems. This "test probe" approach is needed in order to control the amount of data generated. Figure 3 shows an example of FASTER output. The first part of the output is a list of the selected subsystems, transition types, and transition specifications. There are several transition types. Failure is only one kind of transition other types include delay/warm up, and control.

The next part of the output gives the following:

Average time in mode Availability
Standard Deviattion Unavailability
Number of non-zero-runs Reliability

- 1. Number of Modes
- 2. Number of Transitions
- 3. Transition list (type, from mode, to mode)
 - Failure rate-failures/unit time
 - Delay time-transition time delay
 - Control source—input number which drives control transition
- 4. Transfer functions defined for each mode:
 - Number of subprimitives
 - Connection list-defines how subprimitives are connected
 - Parameter and limit values-numeric values for subprimitives

Figure 2: Data Which is Used in FASTER Primitives

Number of stautation runs: 1000 Single run duration: 50000-00

Simulation nese: fdbk, sim

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Figure 3: Example FASTER Output

The operational state of the system can be defined by using "and" and "or" primitives, and a timer probe. The timer probe has two modes which can represent system up or system down. The availability of a given mode is the fraction of time that the system is in the mode during the mission. If the mode corresponds to an operational condition of the system, then it can be interpreted as system availability.

To compute reliability, the actual mission length must be used as the run time. The reliability is then given by number of missions without a critical failure/number of runs. The FASTER output computes this quantity. Examples in section 5 show how to interprete the FASTER output to obtain reliability.

To obtain MTBF and MTBCF, the mean time between transition (MTBT) values are used. In cases when the transition represents a loss of a critical system function, MTBF is actually the MTBCF. Since the system may have multiple functions, many MTBT values are obtained. The user must, therefore, define which transition represents critical failures. To define a single MTBCF, a timer block which monitors a set of "or" blocks which, in turn, detect any critical failure is used.

3 Constraint Directed Editor

The editors in FASTER are used to obtain the data which defines the simulation. To manage this process, the editors are set up to present displays to the user which define or indicate what type of information is needed. The specification process is interactive and dynamic. As the process unfolds, the "needed information" requirements change or can be further identified. For example, the user first specifies a set of subcomponents and from this list of subcomponents, the editor determines the interfacing requirements and generates a display which indicates the data needed to "wire up" the subcomponents. Also, the editor identifies if any parametric information is needed by examining the subcomponents in the user specified list. The user interacts with the editor by supplying the requested information. In some cases, satisfaction of one prompt may result in the generation of secondary prompts.

This approach leads to a simplified specification process. The user responds to the editors prompts until the editor has no more questions. Then the specification is complete. In a traditional specification language, the user can make errors of omission. However, the interactive process used by the FASTER editors prevents this. The user can then concentrate on creating realistic simulations instead of the syntax of a specification language.

There are two major editors in FASTER which are used to define the simulation. These are the "primitive editor" and the "top level editor".

The primitive editor is used to define FASTER primitives which represent the subcomponents of the system being simulated.

These basic subcomponents (referred to as primitives) consist of a state (or mode) transition diagram and a functional transfer function associated with each state or mode in the transition diagram. Below is a summary of the information contained in a primitive:

- 1. Names of each state or mode in the state transition diagram.
- 2. Exit conditions for each state in the transition diagram (failures, control line, warmup, etc.).
- 3. Functional transfer functions for each state in the transition diagram.

The primitive editor obtains this information from the user. For "exit conditions", the primitive editor requests appropriate information which is dependent on the specific exit condition selected. For example, if the exit condition is a "failure", the editor requests which failure equation is to be used. If a constant failure is selected, the editor then

requests a single number relating to the MTBF. If a non-constant distribution is used, the editor will prompt the user for a set of numbers which represent the distribution of failures. Thus, the editor guides the user by identifying what type of information is needed.

The primitive editor also requires that the user describe a transfer function for each mode in the graph. A transfer function is formed by selecting a set of operators from a list of simple logic and threshold functions. To assist the user, the primitive editor prompts the user for connection data which describes how to combine the selected elements. The resulting primitives are stored on a disk file for later use by the high level editor. An example of the operation of the primitive editor is presented in the users guide.

FASTER also has a mission editor which is used to define a scenario or mission for the system being simulated. The user specifies the "external" inputs to the system being simulated. Examples of external inputs are control inputs (which turn the system on and off) and mission load.

The "Top Level Editor" is used to combine primitives together to form the system to be simulated. In a fashion similar to the primitive editor, it generates displays which indicate what information or inputs are to be supplied to the user. This information deals with connections and interfacing the primitives together.

4 FASTER Simulation Function

The FASTER Simulation Function is shown in Figure 4. The heart of the simulation is the function called the FASTER Engine. Because this function is best understood in terms of a virtual machine, it will be referred to as the FASTER Engine. Section 4.1 describes the FASTER Engine in detail.

The other functions shown in Figure 4 are used for set up and control of the FASTER Engine. Since FASTER does Monte Carlo simulations, the number of runs through a mission must be specified. The initialization function obtains this information from the user. Also, the initialization function must obtain from the user the file name of a file which defines the "program" for the Engine. Furthermore, it must "down load" the program. This down loading process is referred to as "building the internal representation".

At this point, the Engine is ready to simulate. The simulation control function causes the engine to carry out the specified number of simulation runs. Each run corresponds to one mission period. At the end of the run, the engine must be restored to the "start of mission" initial condition. Also, run summary information may be recorded. To carry out these tasks, the simulation control function uses functions called "run set up" and "copy initial conditions".




Figure 4: FASTER Simulation Function

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4.1 FASTER Engine

This section describes the FASTER Engine. The set up and control functions involved to initialize the Engine and carry out a number of Monte Carlo runs were discussed at a high level in the previous section. The following paragraph describes how the FASTER Engine can be viewed as a virtual machine. Comparisons between a standard processor and the FASTER Engine are made. The approach used in the FASTER Engine was selected in order to achieve the flexibility needed in modeling complex reconfigurable systems. This design permits an object oriented approach that permits more complex representations of behavior to be easily added to the FASTER system.

The FASTER Engine is best viewed as a virtual machine which executes a program generated by the FASTER Editor. The program for the FASTER Engine consists of a data structure which specifies operators and addresses. Details of this data structure are shown in Figure 5. However, unlike the programs for existing computers, the operators and addresses used in FASTER are high level and relate directly to the problem domain. For example, some of the operators in FASTER are:

- Generate next failure event
- Generate repair event
- Evaluate transfer function

Figure 6 is an overview of the FASTER engine. Each operation in the FASTER engine is represented by FORTRAN code. This code is considered as part of the engine. The specific models defined by the user set up the data structure shown in Figure 5 which controls how the FORTRAN modules representing the various high level operators are executed.

The FASTER Engine is similar, in concept, to a standard processor. Note, however, that the FASTER Engine instructions represent considerably more complex data transformations than the instructions of a standard processor. In fact, FASTER instructions (primitives) are as complex as high level language programs containing three or four subroutines.

Examples of generic functions composing a primitive are:

• predict time of next failure

INDEXED BY
INSTANCE #

INSTANCE TABLE

NEWEST EVENT IS EVALUATED:


- INSTANCE #
- TIME OF EVENT
- KIND OF EVENT
- PARTICULARS, LIKE NEW MODE

Data for each Instance

- A small table of outputs containing each output's current value
- A small table of inputs containing the instance # and output # of the connected primitive
- An encoded description of the mode transition diagram
- An encoded description of the transfer function for each mode
- The current mode and statistics for each mode
- Initial output, mode and statistical values


Figure 5a:


Data Structure Overview



Engine Data Structure

Figure 5b:





- select new mode
- evaluate output

The FASTER Engine function is to control which instructions (actually Fortran subroutines) are executed. Execution of the instruction involves calling the appropriate generic functions.

The FASTER Engine instructions (which are FASTER primitives) differ in an important respect from instructions on a standard processor. This difference is that the FASTER instructions, which form a user specified simulation closely correspond to the real objects in the systems being simulated. This design permits an object oriented approach. Furthermore, in contrast to a standard processor in which an instruction-like "add" must have additional instructions to retrieve and store data from memory, the FASTER Engine does not specify address of data for its "instructions". Instead, the Engine only specifies an "instance" of an instruction which corresponds to an object in the system being simulated. The instance has all the information it needs to carry out the required data transformations. This includes the following:

- 1. List of input and output addresses. These pointers relate to how the instructions supply data to each other. They represent connectivity.
- 2. Specification of which generic functions to use. An instruction is carried out using one or more generic functions.
- 3. Pointers which specify data for the generic functions.

Note that in the above, items 1 and 3 are both pointers to data used by generic functions in 2. The difference between 1 and 3 is as follows: The addresses specified in 1 represent the connectivity or data transfer between primitives (instructions). The connectivity is defined by the user. This type of connectivity is directly related to how the components interact. The data specified in 3 represents instance specific information. In this way, a primitive editor can be used to form new primitives whose properties can be varied by changing data. Also, to allow the user to build primitives, the primitive editor allows the user to define which generic functions are to be used, as well as the data needed.

An important feature of the FASTER Engine is that it is set up to do event driven simulations. The "instructions" or primitives produce events which specify a time value and a specific instances of another instruction. The Engine stores these events in a queue for later execution. Thus, in the FASTER Engine, the instructions invoke (or call) each other.

The order of execution is determined by the time values and the connectivity. Connectivity enters in if two events have the same time value.

The FASTER Simulation Engine simulates the reliability behavior of a complex system. The system to be simulated is specified by the FASTER user (using the FASTER editor) as a composition of primitives. The primitives specify the appropriate high-level operations and data which need to be evaluated. The primitives interact with each other by updating states, updating outputs, and triggering actions (also called events). The Engine makes use of a linked list event data structure to store events, and/or messages. The Engine reads the list to obtain the next action or event which specifies a primitive. When an action is invoked upon the specified primitive, the primitive associated procedures are invoked using primitive specific data. The primitive is viewed as an "object of data" which specifies:

- Which procedure(s) to call in response to events and inputs.
- Primitive specific data for the procedure(s).

The Simulation Engine calls the specified procedures in a time-based sequence. The procedures use the primitive input data. The results of the execution of procedure are:

- Events which trigger other events may be generated.
- Output values may change and affect input values of other blocks.
- The state of the primitive may change.

A change in a given primitive's data/state affects other primitive(s), event(s) or triggers are generated for the affected primitive(s). These events are inserted into the time tagged list. Note that events must contain a time value and the name of the affected primitive. Upon receiving an event, affected primitives will examine the environment (which includes output values transmitted along connections) to determine how to respond. By responding to events by generating events for other primitives, the primitives drive the simulation. The process continues until the "end of run" event is processed.

An event type is specified in the event. The usefulness of specifying an event type as part of the event represents a tradeoff among the following factors:

• Complexity of source primitive vs. destination primitive processing needed to determine event type.

• Loss of generality when event types can only make sense in the context of the destination primitive (object-oriented approach does not need an event type).

Generic event types can be defined (e.g., output change, internal state change), and the source primitive will select the type. The destination primitive will interpret the event in its own context using the event type. Thus, both source and destination blocks will share in the task of determining how the destination block will respond.

The following classes of generic procedures are used:

- Control procedure which determine which subroutines or functions to call.
- State transition graph procedure.
- Failure generator (a random number generator and a parametric function will use primitive specific data to generate time of next failure. Also a branching ratio will be used if multiple mechanisms for failure are to be modeled).
- Input/output relationship processor (a generic interpreter will interpret primitive specific data in order to compute the primitive's outputs from the primitive's inputs (and possibly (in complex cases) the current states)).

The above procedures are considered part of the Engine. These procedures use "primitive specific data", "state data", and "interface data".

The "primitive specific data" is associated with a primitive even before the primitive is used to form a composite. The primitive also has "state data" and "interface data". The state data represents the condition of the primitive during the execution of the simulation. Execution of the procedures cause state data to change. The interface data represents how the primitives are "hooked up". The composite editor obtains the "hook up" information from the user. During simulation execution, this hook up (or interfacing) data will be used in a process to determine when a primitive will generate an event. Also the target of the generated events is determined by this interfacing data. As a general rule, events are sent by the source primitive to any primitive which is "hooked up" to some output value which was modified by the source primitive. Thus, for example, if primitive A's output is hooked to primitive B's input, primitive A sends an event to primitive B when primitive A related processing changes the said output.

The FASTER Engine (execute simulation function) consists of a time tagged event process queue function and a select process function (see Figure 6). The event Process queue

function selects the next event from the queue. This event points to a specific data object called a primitive. The said primitive data object contains data specifying how the primitive must respond to the event. Part of the primitive data object specifies generic procedures and this part will be used by the "select process" function which calls, in a data driven fashion, one or more of the generic processing functions. Other data which are used by the generic procedures are also contained in the primitive data object. Some of the generic processing functions generate data which form new time tagged events. If time tagged event data packets are formed, the "Add Event" function is used to insert new events into the time tagged queue. Figure 7 shows a representation of this processing flow. Underlined phrases highlight the actions carried out by the Simulation Engine.

Do Until Time Exceeds End Time

- (1) Remove Next Event from

 Event Queue. This Event will

 specify the data of interest by specifying
 a pointer to a specific primitive.
- (2) Based on Event type and changes in external data (input changes caused by actions produced by other primitives) select which processes must be executed.

 The selection process will be dependent on the primitive specific data, event type, primitive current state data, and interfaces with other primitives.
- (3) Call Specified Processes.
- (4) Update time using value in the event
- (5) <u>Insert any events</u> into queue and <u>remove</u> any pre-empted events.


End Do

Figure 7: FASTER Engine

5 Modeling Capabilities – Examples

To use FASTER, the system properties must be translated into a representation that can define a FASTER simulation. This section presents some examples which illustrate how this is done. Each example is given in three parts. The first part is a top level description of the system from the users point of view. The second part is a brief discussion as well as a FASTER diagram of the system. The third part is the FASTER output. Details on how to enter the FASTER diagram are in the users guide. The objective of this section is to show examples of the ways systems can be represented by FASTER.

Example 1: Simple Active Redundancy (Deferred Repair). Repair Philosophy – Assume that corrective repair is deferred until a critical failure occurs. Repair occurs instantaneously at that time.



$$\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = \lambda_3 = .001$$
 failures/hr

1 out of 3 units required for success

Compute:


- 1. Mean-Time-Between-Critical-Failure (MTBCF)
- 2. Reliability at time t = 100 Hrs (R(100))


Example 1

FASTER can represent the system in several ways depending on user preference. Two FASTER simulation diagrams are shown for example 1. The first diagram closely parallels, the system and was used to compute the system reliability. The reliability at T=100 hours is the probability that there will be no critical failures before 100 hours. Therefore, a 100 hour simulation was done. To obtain good statistics, 100,000 Monte Carlo runs were requested. The RP block gives the number of critical failures because it causes a repair action when a critical failure occurs. Inspection of the results show that there were 84 non-zero events for the repair process. The results also show that the system reliability is 0.99916.

A second FASTER diagram was created. In this case, each mode relates to the number of subunits which are operational. When 3 units are up, the failure rate is three times the individual rate. As units fail, the failure rate out of the mode decreases. As in the previous case, reliability is obtained by requesting 100 hour missions. In this case the reliability was 0.9992.

To compute MTBCF, it is necessary to run a simulation with a very long mission time to assure that a critical failure occurs during every iteration. To obtain the MTBCF, the same simulation was run for a simulated time of 100,000 hours. The repair process which repairs the system when critical failures occur was deactivated. To do this, the input of EX1UNIT was directly connected to MEX1 so that no repairs can occur. A long mission time was requested to insure that a critical failure occurs for each run. With one critical failure per run, the MTBCF is given by the average time that the GT block spends in mode 2. Note that the GT block is a generic timer which keeps track of system mode. Inspection of the output shows that the MTBCF is 1840 hours.





SIMULATION RESULTS

ţ

Simulation mame: exl Humber of simulation runs: 100000 Single tun duration: 100:000 Humber of monitored primitives: 7 Random number seed: 12145

PRINITIVE DESCR.	TRANSTEION	TRANSITION AND NODE DESCRIPTION	HODE DES	CRIPTION		
		FROM MODE (HO/HAME)	Î.	TO MODE (NO/NAME)		
2 19	delay/warmup	1 Feb		2 141e		
		1 (4)		de 1 c		
:	failure	7 nb		1 Cail		
4 uni	control	1 6011		3 up		
	failure	2 up		1 fail		
S uni	control	1 fail		2 up		
	failure	2 up		1 Cail		
6 gt	control	1 one		2 two		
•	control	2 two		1 one		
PAINITIVE	HODE AVERAGE	STANDARD	0~ROR	AVAILABILITY	UMAVAILABILITY RELIABILITY	
NO NAME	NO TIME	DEVIATION	SHOR			
2 rp	1 6.405-07		:	8.39538574E-09		
	2 1.00E+02	9.15283138E-08	=	9.9999992E-01	8.39500427E-09 9.99160000E-01	
3 uni	1 4.788+00	5.46358116E-02	:	4.78433707E-02	9.52156629E-01 9.99160000E-01	
	2 9.52E+01		9501	9.52156630E-01	4.78433704E-02 9.04990000E-01	
, and T	1 4.788+00	\$.45737296E~02	74	4.78298938-02	0.52170103E-01	
	2 9.52K+01		9438	9.52170103E-01		
			;			
o das	1 4.845+00	5.4795/4/8E~U.	7 7 7 6	4.84223744E-02	Y.313//4406-U. Y.94160000E-U.	
			,			
1 gt	1 0.00E+00		=			
	2 1.00E+02	0.000000000000	:	1.00000000E+00 -	-3.81472631E-13 9.99160000E-01	
			1			
FRINITIVE HO HAME	THAMBS: TOTAL BOTTLE BO	ON THE PERSON	REAU TIME	NELIABILITY CALLETY	UNKELIABILITY System Reliability	Ę
2 50	~	***	1.195+05	19.991600005-01	5 . 4000000E-04	
•	7 7		1.196+05	9.99160000E-01	\$.4000000E-04	
3 uni	~		. 19E+05	9.99160000E-01	6 . 4000000E-04	
		9501 1	.05E+03	9.04990000E-01	9.50100000E-02	
t uni	~	- -	. 19E+05	9.991600008-01	F. 40000000 - 9	
	~ .	9436	.068+03	9.05620000E-01	9. 43800000E-02	
tun c	~ .	⊸ .	195+05	9.991600000000		
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	· ·		105400	10-100007.66		
	•	•	121914.	***********	F2-422227	

SIMULATION RESULTS


Simulation mame: example:
Sumber of simulation runs: 100000
single run duration: 100.0000
sumber of monitored primitives: 3
Randow mumber seed: 12345

PRIMITIVE DESCR. RO HAME 2 rp 3 extunit	TRANSITION TYPE delay/usraup Control Control failure failure	TRAMSITION AND MODE DESCRIPTION FROM MODE(MO/MAME) TO MODE 1 rep 2 idle 1 rep 1 rep 1 fail 2 upl 3 up 2 2 upl 3 up 3 up 2 2 upl 3 up 3 up 2	DE DESCRIPTION OF THE PROPERTY	RIPTION TO MODE (NO/MANE) 2 Adio 1 rep 2 up3 3 up2 3 up3		
4 9t	failure failure failure control	7 0 0 1 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7	M T T A M A	tupi tupi tupi tuo one		
PRINITIVE NO MANE 2 CP	MODE AVERAGE MO TIME 1 8.00E-07 2 1.00E+02	STANDARD DEVIATION 8.93578189E-08 8.93264451E-08	BOM-0 A BUMB 40 7.	AVAILABILITY (7.995605478-09 9.99999928-01 7	UMAVAILABILITY 9.9999993E-01 7.99541473E-09	BELIABILITY 9.99266600E-01 9.99260606E-01
3 exiunit	1 0.00K+01 2 8.65K+01 3 1.27K+01 4 8.85K-01	0.00000000E+00 8.60295668E-02 8.21188465E-02 2.10576057E-02	25787 6. 2601 1.	0.00000000E+00 8.646456E-01 1.26507016E-01 8.84749857E-03	1.00000000E+00 1.35354514E-01 8.73492984E-01 9.91152501E-01	9.9920000E-01 7.42130606-01 9.7399000E-01 9.9920000E-01
₽	1 0.00E+00 2 1.00E+02	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000	0 0	0.00000000E+00 1.00000000E+00 1.0000000E+00 -1.90727434E-13	1.00000000E+00 -1.90727434E-13	9.99200000E-01
PRINITIVE NO MAME 2 rp	TRANS. TOTAL NO FR TO OCCURICS 1 2 80 2 1 80	MON-HOM MON HOM MON HO	• •	BELIABILITY .99200000E-01 .99200000E-01	UMBELIABILITY	
) exiunt		1 1 8 8 8 6 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1.258+05 9 1.168+03 9 1.188+03 9 1.68+03 9 1.68+03 9 1.68+03 9	.9920000E-01 .1364000E-01 .1344000E-01 .1490000E-01 .86910000E-01	8.000000000000000000000000000000000000	
4 ₩	N H	80 80 80 1.2	Syst	os <u>1.922000001-01</u> 0.00 os <u>(1.922000001-01</u> 0.00 System Reliability	6.000000000E-04 4.000000000E-04 Lity	

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		HATTANA BOOK AND HATTANA		E>		
TYPE	•	FROM MODE (NO/WANE)	ME)	TO MODE (MO/KANE)	_	
delay/var	Bup 1	r.		2 idle		
Control	r•	idi.		1 rep		
control	7	fail		2 up3		
failure	7	cdn -		3 up2		
failure	•	up3		3 up2		
farlur.	~	edn .		3 up2		
failure	_	rdn i		4 upl		
far lure	~	up2		4 upl		
failure	•	upl		1 fail		
control	7	• #0 ·		2 two		
control	•	two		1 one		
	VERAGE	STANDARD	O-MOM	AVAILABILITY	UBAVAILABILITY	RELIABILITY
	TIME	DEVIATION	RUMS			
.6	198-04	7.60112968E-08	10000	9.78601074E-09	9.9999990E-01	0.0000000000000
2 1.	00E+05	7.65465575E-06	10000	9.99999991E-01	4.92828370E-09	0.00000000E+00
6	828+04	1.166479978+01		9.81646266E-01	1.83537341E-02	1.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
	345402	OOTHYCEOUSEL E	1000	1 1771516-01	10-3543C3339 0	***************************************
•	986+02	4 910304078+00		A 982011212123	10-100000000000000000000000000000000000	
	001100	1.00877590E+01		1.00343885E-02	9.89965612E-01	0.0000000E+00
•						
 [828+04	1.16647997E+01		9.81646266E-01	1.83537341E-02	1.0000000E+00
<u>.</u>	64E+03	I.16647997E+01		1.835373498-02	9.81646265E-01	0.0000000E+00
Σ	TBCF					
TRAMS.	TOTAL B	_	AN TINE	RELIABILITY	URBELIABILIT	
CB TO	OCCURRE	RUMS	TW TRNS			
7	1000	10000	. 00E+05	0.000000000.0	1.00000000E+0	
7 7	1000	10000	.00E+05	0.000000000000	1.0000000E+0	
7		0 0	.00E+05	1.00000000001	0.0000000000000	_
7	336	3366	. 97E+05	6.63400000E-01	3.36600000E-0	
2 3	337	3372	.97E+05	6.62800000E-01	3.3720000E-0	
7	326	3262	.07E+05	6.73400000E-01	3 . 26 200000E-0	
~	501	5017 1	. 99E+05	4.94300000E-01	5.0170000E-0	
~	161	1983 2	.01E+05	5.01700000E-01	4.9830000E-0	
T #	1000	100001	. 00E+05	0.00000000E+00	1.000000001	_
1 2		•	.00E+05	1.0000000E+00	0.000000000.0	
7	1000	10000	.00E+05	0.0000000000000	1.00000000E+0	_
	A CONTRACTOR A CON	AVERAGE 1. OFF-04 1.	AVERAGE TIME 2 Up3 2 Up3 2 Up3 3 Up3 4 Up1 1 One 2 Up3 3 Up3 4 Up1 1 One 4 Up1 1 One 4 Up1 1 One 5 Up3 5 Up3 5 Up3 6 U	AVERAGE STAMBARD BY 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.0	AVERAGE STANDARD MON-CONTROL 1 OF CONTROL 1 OF CONTROL 2 UP3 2 UP3 3 UP2 3 UP3 3 UP3 4 UP3	AVERAGE STAMBARD MON-O AVAILABILITY 1000000000000000000000000000000000000

Example 2: Simple Standby Redundancy (Deferred Repair). Repair Philosophy – Assume that corrective repair is deferred until a critical failure occurs. Repair occurs instantaneously at that time.



$$\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = \lambda_3 = \lambda_4 = .001$$
 failures/hr

2 out of 4 units required for success


Compute:

- 1. MTBCF
- 2. Reliability at time t = 100 Hrs (R(100))

Example 2

Example 2 is similar to example 1 except that there are 4 units and 2 out of 4 are required for acceptable operation. Also since this is standby redundancy, the units are assumed not to fail in the standby mode. Figure 2 shows the FASTER diagram which represents the system. A GT block triggers repair when the third failure occurs. To obtain the system reliability for a 100 hour mission, 100,000 runs are conducted. The resulting reliability is 0.99886. To compute MTBCF, a long mission (100,000 hours) is simulated with repair deactivated by connecting EXAM2 directly to MEX1. In this case the MTBCF is 1500 hours.

Example 2



SIMULATION RESULTS

Simulation name: EXAMPLE 2 Bumber of simulation runs: 100000 Single run duration: 100.0000 Bumber of monitored primitives: 3 Random number seed: 12345

NO HAME	TYPE	TRANSTILL AND NODE DESCRIPTION PROF NODE	NODE DES	TO MODE(NO/MAME)	_	
2 10	delay/warmup	1 500		2 1d1.		
,	TOILEON	•1bt 7		de 1		
3 0x4BZ	Control	1 5811		2 up4		
	e a la l			7		
4		2dn +		1 6011		
	TOURIS	• ao -		083 7		
	control	2 two		1 000		
PRIMITIVE	MODE AVERAGE	STANDARD	O-MOM	AVAILABILITY	UMAVAILABILITY	RELIABILITY
NO NAME	HIME ON	DEVIATION	RUNS			
2 69	1 1.14E-06	1.06652180E-07	114	1.13938332E-08	10-36866666.6	9.98860000E-01
	2 1.00K+02	1.06614287E-07	116	9.9999999999	1.13936424E-08	9.9886000E-01
, 4,,4,	1 2 648-02	FO.350475634 F	•	10-3633EC640 C	10-334130100	0074000000
			•	FO-4100511F6.4	10-301-0-66-6	00140000000
	2 9.07E+01	7.36323521E-02	18174	9.066829612-01	9.33170390E-02	8.18260000E-01
	3 8.71E+00	7.01216087E-02	1798	8.71436212E-02	9.12856379E-01	9.82020000E-01
	4 5.88E-01	1.69653557E-02	11	5.87914467E-03	9.94120855E-01	9.94860000E-01
•	CO. 940 C 1		•	אט שנאאנרנאט נ		
, ,	1019FE-7 4		•	\$0-3700C/7EK.7	TO-307/CO/66.6	7 · 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
	2 1.00E+02	3.46837402E-03	114	9.99705726E-01	2.94273662E-04	9.988600008-01
PRIMITIVE	TRANS . TOTAL NO MON-ZENO	_	KEAN TIME	RELIABILITY	UNRELIABILITY	
NO NAME	FR TO OCCURRES	_	BETW TRNS			
2 10		114	. 77E+04	9.988600008-01	1.140000000	
	7 7	114	.77E+04	9.98860000E-01	1.14000000E-03	
3 exam2	1 2	•	. 00E+02	1.0000000000	0 . 00000000E+00	•
	2 3 18	18174 18174 5.	. 50E+02	8.18260000E-01	1.81740000E-0	
	3 4 6	1798 5	. 56E+03	9.8202000E-01	1.79800000E-02	. ~
	~	114	. 77E+04	9.98860000E-01	1.140000000	
4 91	7		.00E+02	1.000000000001	0.00000000000000	
	. ~	114 114	775+04	TO SEE SOUD OF THE PARTY OF	1 400000000	
	•					•


System Reliability

SIMULATION RESULTS

Simulation name: example 2 Mumber of simulation runs: 10000 Single run duration: 100000.0 Humber of monitored primitives: 3 Random number seed: 12345

(1)	OMAVAILABILITY 39 9.99999908-01 31 9.26424789E-09	11 1.49647246E-02 13 9.95036147E-01 13 9.95013768E-01 13 9.94985360E-01)1 1.49647246E-02)2 9.85035275E-01	C UMRELIABILITY	1.00000000E+00		•	1.00000000E+00
ICRIPTION TO MODE(MO/MANE) 2 idle 2 idle 2 up4 3 up4 3 up3 4 up2 1 fail 2 two 1 one	AVAILABILITY 9.790618908-09 9.99999918-01	9.85035275E-01 4.96385312E-03 4.98623240E-03 5.01463990E-03	9.45035275E-01 1.49647253E-02	RELIABILITY	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000	1.0000000K+00	0 - 00000000000000000000000000000000000	0 . 00000000E+00
WD RODE DES	MOM-0 NUMS -04 10000 -05 10000	1+00 1+00 1+00 1+00 1+00 1+00 1+00	0 00001	HEAN TIME BETW TRES	1.006+05	1.00E+05	1.005+05	1.00E+05 1.00E+05
FRAMSITION AND MODE DESCRIPTION FROM MODE(MO/MANE) TO MODE 1 if rep 1 idle 1 rep 1 rep 1 rep 1 rep 2 up4 2 up4 4 up2 4 up3 4 up2 1 rep 1 r	STANDARD DEVIATION 8.34740206E-08 1.39754247E-05	8.51502609E+00 4.95649910E+00 4.96601486E+00 4.94715977E+00	8.51502609E+00 8.51502609E+00	IO MON-ZERO	10000	•	- ~	10000
фл ж и о и	AVERAGE TIME 9.795-04 1.00E+05	9.85E+04 4.96E+02 4.99E+02 5.01E+02	9.85E+04 1.50E+03 MTBCF	TRAMS. TOTAL NO MON-ZERO	1 10000	10000	10000	10000
TRAMSITION TYPE delay/warm control control failure failure control	MODE ED ED FO	N M W	H 64	A E	4 6		• •	→ → (
NO MAME 2 FP 3 exem2 4 gc	PRIMITIVE NO NAME 2 FP	3 •ו•2	g t	PRIMITIVE NO NAME	2 rp	• x a m 2		gt

Example 3: Simple Active Redundancy (Immediate Repair). Repair Philosophy – Immediate concurrent repair is assumed. A maintenance crew is available to immediately repair any failed resources no matter how many fail during the same time period. Repair is performed while the remaining operating unit supports the operational function.



$$\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = .001 \text{ failures/hr}$$

$$\mu_1 = \mu_2 = .05 \text{ repairs/hr}$$

1 out of 2 units required for success

Compute:

- 1. MTBCF
- 2. System Mean-Time-To-Repair (MTTR)
- 3. Steady State Availability

Example 3

Example 3 is a system for which repair begins immediately when a unit failure occurs. A non-constant repair time is used. The repair process has an MTTR of 0.05 repairs/hour which is implemented using a failure transition rate equal to 0.05. Each subsystem has an MTBF of 1000 hours. The LIB_OR defines the overall system operation and the LIB_TIMER keeps track of the up time to compute availability.


The first run was for a 100,000 hour mission. Results show the system availability of 0.99962 and an MTBCF of 26,400 hours. To compute the MTTR of the system, three numbers from the FASTER output are used. These are: the number of runs (N = 5000), total number of failures (NF = 18948), and the average time under repair (TR = 37.6 hours). Note that NF is obtained by the number of mode 2 to mode 1 transitons of LIB_TIMER block 5 and TR is the average time LIB_TIMER spends in mode 1.


The MTTR is given by:

MTTR = TR/(NF/NR)

The resulting value is 9.9 hours.

EXAMPLE 3.






SIMULATION RESULTS

Simulation name: ex3 Mumber of simulation runs: 5000 Single run duration: 10000.0 Mumber of monitored primitaves: 4 Random number seed: 12345

PRIMITIVE DESCR.	TRABSITION	TRAMSITION AND MODE DESCRIPTION	HODE DE			
NO NAME	TAPE.	PROM MODE (NO / NAME)	AE)	CANCEL ON / MOOR OF		
2 u3	failure	1 up	•	2 failed		
	failure	2 failed		an T		
3 13	failure	dn 1		2 failed		
246.4 47. 8		Peling .		u up		
	Control	Z GOWR		2 up		
		<u>.</u>		200 1		
PRINITIVE	HODE AVERAGE	STANDARD	O-MOM	AVAILABILITY	UMAVAILABILITY	DET.TABILITY
NO NAME	NO TIME	DEVIATION	RUMS			
2 o3	1 9.80E+04	3.81163192E+00	2000	9.80456117E-01	1.95438835E-02	0.00000000000000
	2 1.95E+03	3.81163192E+00	2000	1.95438837E-02	9.80456116E-01	0 . 00000000E+00
3 43	1 9.805+04	3.88957000E+00	8000	9.40403903E-01	1.059609698-02	
	2 1.96E+03	3.88957000E+00	2000	1.959609711-02	9.80403903E-01	0.0000000E+00
5 lib_timer	2 1.002+03	3.87400538E-01	4863	3.763886538-04	9.99623611E-01	2.34000000E-02
	Average time	Average time under repair		Availability		70-300000000000000000000000000000000000
PRIMITIVE	TRAMS. TOTAL NO MON-KERO		MEAN TIME	BELIABILITY	THE P. T. P. S. T. T. S.	
	FR TO OCCURNCS		TREES			
2 c3	1 2 489	2000	1.028+03	0 - 0000000000 0	1.0000000E+00	
	2 1 488	2000	1.02E+03	0.00000000000	1.0000000E+00	
2	1 7 490		. 02E+03	00.000000000000000000000000000000000000	1.0000000E+00	_
1 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4		2000	. 0 4 2 4 0 3	00+11000000000	1 . 00000000E+00	
	1 2	18947 4883 2.	100	2.34000000E-02	9.76600000E-01	
				7 - 3400000R-07	9 . / 5 6 6 0 0 0 0 0 E - 0 1	
	3.79 events/run	nts/run M	MTBCF			
	MTTR = 37	MTTR = 37.6/3.71 = 9.92				

Example 4: Simple Active Redundancy (Scheduled Preventive Maintenance). Repair Philosophy—Assume that corrective repair is deferred until a critical failure occurs, repair occurs instantaneously at that time, however scheduled preventive maintenance is conducted at regular time intervals. During each scheduled maintenance action each unit of the system is repaired, while the remaining operating units carry on the system function. T_p denotes the scheduled maintenance interval. Every T_p hours the system is replenished, i.e. all failed units are repaired and put back on line.



$$\lambda_1 = \lambda_2 = \lambda_3 = .005 \text{ failures/hr}$$
 $T_p = 100 \text{ Hrs}$

1 out of 3 units required for mission success

Computer:

- 1. MTBCF
- 2. Reliability at time t 200 Hr

Example 4


The FASTER diagram for example 4 includes a mission block which normally outputs a 2 but outputs a 1 every 100 hours to cause a failure reset of any failed U4 units. To set up the mission block to output a 1 every 100 hours, the mission editor is used to enter the data in the table which is on the figure for example 4. Details on how to use the mission editor are in the user's guide. The GT block also outputs a 1 if all three U4 units fail. This causes all three U4 units to reset.

To run the simulation, a mission time of 200 hours was used because reliability at 200 hours is desired.

The resulting system reliability is 0.8778 which is obtained from block GT-7. Also, the MBTCF of the system is 1590 hours. The results also show that the number of total critical failures in all 10,000 missions was 1257 and that the number of preventative maintenance repairs for one U4 subsystem is about 6684. This shows that preventative maintenance greatly increases the system reliability and MTBCF.

Note that in this example, the MTBCF is computed using a short run equal to the mission length. This is possible because the system is reset every 100 hours. As long as the mission time is a multiple of 100 hours, this approach is valid.

In contrast, the other examples require a long simulation to compute MTBCF values. This is because the critical failure rate is time dependent due to the changes in the system. In example 6, as more individual primitives fail, the critical failure rate increases. Thus the critical failure rate at t=0 is lower than the critical failure rate at t=720 hours because the system is likely to have some failed subunits at t=720 hours. If the approach used in example 4 were used in example 6, a longer (and wrong) MTBCF would be obtained.



SIMULATION RESULTS

### FROM MODELMO/NAME) TO NODELMO/NAME) ###################################	PRIMITIVE DESCR.	TRANSITION	TRANSITION AND MODE	ND MODE DES	DESCRIPTION		
Control 1 up 2 fail 1 up 2 fail 2 fa	NO NAME	TABE	FROM MODE (NO.	/HAME)	TO MODE (NO/HAME)		
December 2 fill Dece	2 u4	failure	d n 1		2 fail		
CONECOL 2 fail 2 fail 2 fail 2 fail 2 fail 2 fail 2 control 2 fail 3 fail 4 p CONTROL 2 fail 4 p CONTROL 2 fail 5 fail 5 fail 6 control 2 fail 6 control 7 fail 6 control 8 fail 6 control 8 fail CONTROL 8 fail 6 control 8 fail 6 control 1 1.58E-02 4.4938931E-01 633 7.1840982E-01 7.876393EE-01 7.8763993EE-01 7.8763993EE-01 7.8763993EE-01 7.8763993EE-01 7.8763993EE-01 7.8763993EE-01 7.886393EE-01 7.8763993EE-01 7.886393EE-01 7.8763993EE-01 7.8763993EE-01 7.8863993EE-01 7.8763993EE-01 7.8863993EE-01 7.88639993EE-01 7.88639993EE-01 7.88639993EE-01 7.88639993EE-01 7.88639993EE-01 7.88639993EE-01 7.886399993EE-01 7.886399993EE-01 7.886399993EE-01 7.886399999999999999999999999999999999999		control	2 fail		1 up		
## Control 2 # 1		control	2 (41)		1 up		
CORECOL 2 Eail 1 UP CORECOL 3 Eail 1 UP CORECOL 4 Eail 2 UP CORECOL 5 Eail 2 UP CORECOL 6 Eail 2 UP CORECOL 5 Eail 5 UP CORECOL 5		failure			2 fail		
CONTROL 2 Eail 1 Up 2 Eail 1 Up 2 Eail 1 Up 2 Eail 1 Up 2 Eail		control			1 up		
### CONTROL 10 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1		control			1 up		
CONTrol 2 E411 1 UP CONTrol 2 E401		failure			2 fail		
CONTECL 2 Eail 1 Une 2 Usp Control 2 Use Con		control			1 up		
Control 1 0 no		control			1 40		
NODE AVERAGE STANDARD NON-0 AVAILABILITY UNAVAILABILITY		control	1 on•		2 two		
NODE		control	2 tvo		l one		
## PER PROPERTION # # # # # # # # #	PRIMITIVE			0-20	AVAILABILITY	UNAVATLABILITY	2
1.58E+02 4.5055075E-01 6371 7.87610938E-01 2.12369062E-01 1.58E+02 4.69388921E-01 6353 7.88005821E-01 7.87630937E-01 1.58E+02 4.69388921E-01 6323 7.88005821E-01 7.87630937E-01 1.58E+02 4.6528822E-01 6291 7.92257954E-01 2.07742046E-01 1.58E+02 4.6528822E-01 6291 7.92257954E-01 2.07742046E-01 1.58E+02 4.6528822E-01 6291 7.92257954E-01 2.07742046E-01 1.58E+02 4.6528822E-01 6273 2.07742047E-01 7.82557953E-01 1.58E+02 1.24573581E-01 1224 1.84188625E-02 9.81581138E-01 2	NO NAME		٥	SHOK			i
2 4.25E+01 4.50550795E-01 6353 7.8800582E-01 7.87630937E-01 2 4.26E+02 4.4938921E-01 6325 7.8800582E-01 2.11994177E-01 2 4.26E+02 4.46528622E-01 6291 7.9255954E-01 2.07742046E-01 2 4.15E+02 4.46528622E-01 6271 2.07742047E-01 7.92257953E-01 2 4.15E+02 1.24652862E-01 6271 2.07742047E-01 7.92257953E-01 2 1.96E+02 1.24571581E-01 1224 1.84188625E-02 9.81581138E-01 1.24571581E-01 1224 1.84188625E-02 9.81581138E-01 1.84188625E-02 9.81581138E-01 1.24571581E-01 1224 9.81581138E-01 1.84188625E-02 9.81581138E-01 1.25E+02 0.000000000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.00000000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.31000000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.31000000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.31000000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.3100000E-01 0.31000000E-01 0.31		-	÷		7.87630938E-01	2.12369062E-01	3.6
1.58E+02 4.49388921E-01 6393 7.48005823E-01 7.88005823E-01 2 4.24E+01 4.49388921E-01 6391 7.9255954E-01 7.88005823E-01 2 4.15E+02 4.46528822E-01 6291 7.9255954E-01 2.07742047E-01 7.9255953E-01 2.07742047E-01 2.07742047		-	÷		2.12369063E-01	7.87630937E-01	3.6
2 4.24E+01 4.4652822E-01 6291 7.9257954E-01 7.00005623E-01 2 4.15E+02 4.4652822E-01 6271 7.9257954E-01 7.92257953E-01 2 4.15E+02 4.4652822E-01 6271 7.9257954E-01 7.92257953E-01 2 1.96E+02 1.245713581E-01 1224 1.44184625E-02 9.81581138E-01 7.92257955E-02 7 1.96E+02 1.245713581E-01 1224 9.81581138E-01 1.44184625E-02 9.81581138E-01 1.44184625E-02 9.81581138E-01 1.44184625E-02 7 1.96E+02 1.245713581E-01 1224 9.81581138E-01 1.44184625E-02 9.81581138E-01 1.44184625E-02 9.81581138E-01 1.44184625E-02 9.81581138E-01 1.24610000E-01 1.44184625E-02 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7		-	•		7.88005823E-01	2.11994177E-01	3.6
1.58E+02 4.4652822E-01 6291 7.92257954E-01 3.07742046E-01 3.68E+00 4.465282E-01 6273 2.07742047E-01 7.92257953E-01 3.68E+00 1.24573531E-01 1224 9.81581136E-01 1.84188625E-02 3.96E+02 1.24590000E-01 6.37100000E-01 3.96E+02 1.2469000E-01 6.37100000E-01 3.96E+02 1.2469000E-01 6.37100000E-01 3.96E+02 1.2469000E-01 6.37100000E-01 3.96E+03 1.2469000E-01 6.37100000E-01 3.96E+03 1.2469000E-01 6.37100000E-01 3.96E+03 1.2469000E-01 6.37100000E-01 3.96E+03 1.2469000E-01 1.2460000E-01 3.96E+03 1.2469000E-01 1.2460000E-01 3.96E+03 1.2469000E-01 1.2460000E-01 3.96E+03 1.2469000E-01 1.2460000E-01 3.96E+03 1.2460000E-01 1.2460000E-01 3.96E+03 1.246000E-01 1.2460000E-01 3.96E+03 1.246000E-01 1.2460000E-01 3.96E+03 1.2460000E-01 1.2460000E-01 3.96E+0		•	•		2.11994177E-01	7.88005823E-01	3.6
1 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 6 - 7 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2 - 2							
3.68E+00 1.24573581E-01 1224 1.64186625E-02 9.81581138E-01 2					10-9168/6776-/	4.0//4/048E-01	,
3.68E+00 1.24573581E-01 1224 1.84188625E-02 9.81581138E-01 2 1.96E+02 1.24573581E-01 1224 9.61561136E-01 1.64186625E-02 3 26E+02 1.24573581E-01 1224 9.61561136E-01 1.64186625E-02 4 2 2 2 2 3 3 3 3 3 3					10-4/ 10-1	**************************************	
TRAMS. TOTAL MO MOM-ZERO MEAN TIME RELIABILITY UBRELIABILITY TRAMS. TOTAL MO MOM-ZERO MEAN TIME RELIABILITY UBRELIABILITY TO OCCURAGE TO 2.00E+02 1.0000000E+01 6.37100000E-01 2 1 7846 6.356 2.54E+02 1.6000000E-01 6.35500000E-01 2 1 7846 6.356 2.54E+02 1.6000000E-01 6.35500000E-01 2 1 7849 6.318 2.54E+02 1.0000000E-01 6.35500000E-01 2 1 7849 6.328 2.54E+02 1.7000000E-01 6.32500000E-01 2 1 7849 6.328 2.54E+02 1.7000000E-01 6.32500000E-01 2 1 7849 6.328 2.54E+02 1.7000000E-01 6.23100000E-01 2 1 7849 6.328 2.54E+02 1.7000000E-01 1.2400000E-01 3 1 1262 1.224 1.54E+03 8.7760000E-01 1.2400000E-01 5 1 1262 1.224 1.54E+03 8.77600000E-01 1.2400000E-01 5 1 1262 1.224 1.2400000E-01 1.2400000					1.84188625E-02	9.81581138E-01	
TRAMS. TOTAL MO MOM-RENO MEAN TIME RELIABILITY FR TO OCCURACS NUMS BETW TRMS 1 2 3 0 0 0 2.06E+02 3.6290000E-01 2 1 7846 6.356 2.5E+02 3.6490000E-01 2 1 7846 6.356 2.5E+02 3.64790000E-01 2 1 784 6.325 2.5E+02 3.6790000E-01 2 1 784 6.325 2.5E+02 3.6790000E-01 2 1 784 6.325 2.5E+02 3.6790000E-01 2 1 784 6.325 2.5E+02 3.70900000E-01 2 1 784 6.325 2.5E+02 3.7090000E-01 2 1 784 6.335 2.5E+02 3.70900000E-01 2 1 784 6.335 2.5E+02 3.70900000E-01 2 1 785 6.391 2.5E+02 3.70900000E-01 2 1 774 6.373 2.5EF+02 3.70900000E-01 2 1 774 6.373 2.5EF+02 3.70900000E-01 2 1 1262 1224 11.5EF+03 8.7760000E-01 2 1 1262 1224 11.5EF+03 8.7760000E-01					9.61561136E-01	1.84188625E-02	.77
FRAMES: YOLKLE DE MONENTE TIME RELIABILITY 1 2 05CUNLECS SUMES BETH TIME RELIABILITY 2 1 7937 5371 2.52E+02 3.6290000E-01 2 1 786 6356 2.58E+02 3.64400000E-01 2 1 784 6355 2.58E+02 3.6790000E-01 2 1 7759 6291 2.58E+02 3.7990000E-01 2 1 7759 6273 2.58E+02 3.7990000E-01 2 1 7759 6273 2.58E+02 3.7900000E-01 2 1 7759 6273 2.58E+02 3.7900000E-01 2 1 7759 6273 2.58E+02 3.7900000E-01 2 1 7750 6273 2.58E+03 8.77600000E-01 2 1 1262 1224 11.58E+03 8.77600000E-01 2 1 1262 1224 11.58E+03 8.7760000E-01				:			
u4 1 2 7937 6371 2.22E+02 3.6290000E-01 2 1 7086 6356 2.5EE+02 3.64400000E-01 2 1 7086 6356 2.5EE+02 3.64400000E-01 2 1 7086 6358 2.5EE+02 3.6470000E-01 2 1 7074 6328 2.5EE+02 3.6790000E-01 2 1 7074 6328 2.5EE+02 3.6790000E-01 2 1 7759 6291 2.5EE+02 3.7990000E-01 2 1 7759 6291 2.5EE+02 3.7990000E-01 2 1 7759 6291 2.5EE+02 3.7900000E-01 2 1 7759 6291 2.5EE+02 3.7900000E-01 2 1 7769 6291 2.5EE+02 3.7900000E-01 3 1262 1224 1.5EE+03 8.7560000E-01	MAINITIVE MO MANE		0	MEAN TIME	RECIABILITY	UBRELIABILIT	-
u4 2 1 7936 5356 2.58fe+0.2 1.0000000E+0.0 2 1 7936 5356 2.58fe+0.2 1.6000000E+0.0 2 1 7936 5356 2.58fe+0.2 3.64700000E+0.0 2 1 7936 5356 2.58fe+0.2 3.64700000E+0.0 2 1 7874 6325 2.58fe+0.2 3.67500000E+0.0 2 1 759 6591 2.58fe+0.2 3.70900000E+0.0 2 1 7710 6273 2.58fe+0.3 8.77500000E+0.0 2 1 7710 6273 2.58fe+0.3 8.77500000E+0.0 2 1 1 126.2 1224 11.58fe+0.3 8.77500000E+0.0 2 1 126.2 1224 11.58fe+0.0 2 1 126.2 126.2 1224 11.58fe+0.0 2 1 126.2 1224 11.58fe+0.0 2 1 126.2 1224 1	2 04)		2.52E+02	3.62900000E-01	6.37166666E-6	_
u4 2 7930 755 2.58+02 3.64400000E-01 2 1 2 7930 753 2.58+02 3.6470000E-01 2 1 0 0 2.00E+02 1.0000000E+00 2 1 7874 6325 2.54E+02 3.7750000E-01 2 1 7879 6291 2.58E+02 3.7750000E-01 2 1 7750 6291 2.58E+02 3.7750000E-01 2 1 7750 6291 2.58E+02 3.7750000E-01 2 1 7750 6291 2.58E+02 3.7750000E-01 2 1 7262 1224 1.58E+03 8.7750000E-01 2 1 1262 1224 1.58E+03 8.7750000E-01 2 1 1262 1224 1.58E+03 8.7750000E-01				2.00E+02	1.0000000E+00	0.000000000	
u4 2 7930 753 2.52E+02 3.64700000E-01 2 1 0 0 2.00E+02 1.0000000E+00 2 1 0 0 2.00E+02 1.0000000E+00 2 1 7854 6325 2.54E+02 3.70500000E-01 2 1 7759 6291 2.58E+02 3.7050000E-01 2 1 7750 6291 2.58E+02 3.7090000E-01 2 1 7760 6291 2.58E+03 8.7760000E-01 2 1 1262 1224 1.58E+03 8.7760000E-01 2 1 1262 1224 1252 1224 1252 1224 1252 1224 1252 1224 1252 1224 1252 1224 1252 1224 1252 1224 1252 1224 1252 1224 1252 1224 1252 1252				2.54E+02	3 . 6440000E-01	6.3560000E-0	
u4 1 2 1 4 6 2.00E+02 1.0000000E+00 2 1 7759 6135 2.54E+02 3.0750000E-01 2 1 7759 61391 2.54E+02 3.7050000E-01 2 1 7710 6273 2.58E+02 3.7050000E+00 2 1 1262 1.24 1.58E+03 8.7750000E-01 2 1 1262 1.24 1.26 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.26 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24				2.52E+02	3.6470000E-01	6.35300000E-0	-
u4 1 7874 6325 2.548402 3.67500000E-01 1 2 7759 6291 2.588402 3.70900000E-01 2 1 7710 6273 2.598402 3.7050000E-01 2 1 7710 6273 2.598402 3.72500000E-01 2 1 726 1224 1.588403 8.77600000E-01 2 1 1262 1224 1.588403 8.77600000E-01 2 1 1262 1224 1.588403 8.77600000E-01			•	2.00E+02	1.0000000E+00	0 . 00000000E+0	
u4 1 2 7759 6291 2.58E402 3.7090000E-01 2 1 0 0 2.00E402 3.7090000E-01 2 1 7710 6.279000E-01 2 1 7710 6.279000E-01 2 1 7760000E-01 2 1 7760 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0				2.54E+02	3.67500000E-01	6.32500000E-0	-
9t 1.00e000000E+00 2.10E+02 1.00e00000E+00 2.1 7710 6.273 2.59E+02 3.77500000E-01 2.1 1.26 1.256 1.24 11.58E+03 6.7750000E-01 2.1 1.26 1.256 1.254 11.58E+03 6.7750000E-01 2.1 1.26 1.256 1.254 11.58E+03 6.7750000E-01 2.1 1.26 1.256 1.2				2.54E+02	3.70900000E-01	6.29100000E-0	~
9t 1262 1273 2.588+0.3 3.72500008-0.1 1 2 1262 1224 1.588+0.3 8.75600008-0.1 2 1 1262 1224 [1.588+0.3] (8.776000008-0.1 MTBCF System Reliabil				2.00E+02	1 . 00000000E+00	0 · 000000000 · 0	
90 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.24 1.34 1.7760000E-01 1 1262 1224 1.34E+0] (0.7760000E-01) 1 MTBCF System Reliabili				2.598+02	3.72700000E-01	6.27300000E-0	_
MTBCF System Reliabil					8 1760000K-01	1.22400000E-0	-
		•		1.366+03	1 / 000000 F	1.224000001-0	-
				MTBCF	System Kellan	111ty	

3.62900000E-01 3.64400000E-01


BELIABILITY

3.64700000E-01

2.07742046E-01 3.70900000E-01 7.92257953E-01 3.72700000E-01

9.81581138E-01 8.77600000E-01 1.84188625E-02 8.77600000E-01

Example 5: Active Redundancy (with Imperfect Diagnostics and Switching), upon the occurrence of a failure, the faulty unit is switched off. Repair Philosophy - Assume that manual corrective repair is deferred until a critical failure occurs.



R - Recovery/switching Unit

D - Diagnostics Unit

P - Prime Unit

1 out of 2 units required for mission success

Assumptions:

- Recovery unit failure does not immediately cause system failure but, next prime failure after a recovery unit failure will cause system failure.
- Failure to switch off a failed unit will cause a system failure.
- Diagnostics unit failure does not immediately cause system failure then a system failure will occur (because the failed unit will not be able to be switched off).
- Undetected prime unit failure causes system failure.
- Diagnositics units are inactivated when the associated prime unit is switched off.

 $\lambda_R = .0002 \text{ failures/hr}$

 $\lambda_D = .0002 \text{ failures/hr}$

 $\lambda_p = .001 \text{ failures/hr}$

Fraction of Faults Detectable (FFD) 1.00

Compute:

1. MTBCF

2. Reliability at time $t \sim 1000 \ hr$

Example 5

Example 5-FASTER Diagram.

The following figures show a FASTER diagram for example 5. The diagnositics unit detects all failures when there is no failure of the diagnostics unit. The primary unit has four modes. The diagram for the primary unit (PUNIT) shows these modes. Under each mode are three parameter blocks which drive the outputs of PUNIT with the indicated value. The failure detect line (D) becomes a "2" just after a failure. If the PUNIT is switched off (mode 4) by driving C4 with a "4", then a unit failure occurs. However, if the unit is not switched of (before T=.001), then a system failure occurs (mode 3). By using "ANDS" and "OR" (see top level example 5 diagram), a critical failure is defined as 1) both units fail or 2) at least one unit fails and is not switched off.

The primitive DUNIT detects failures and causes the R block to switch off the PUNIT. If DUNIT fails, then it will not detect the failure. Also if the R unit fails, switching will not occur. The block GT was shown in previous examples. GT is a timer which keeps track of which mode the system is in.


If imperfect failure detection occurs (FFD = 0.9 for example) then the PUNIT block could be modified so that 10% of the time the "2" on output number 3 is set to "1". A "PROB" subprimitive could be used to do this.


Example 5 Results:


Three runs were made for example 5. The first run was set up to obtain reliability for a 1000 hour mission. Repair was disabled so that the number fo critical failures in 10,000 missions could be obtained. The number of mode 2 to mode 1 transitions gives this number (4746). The overall system reliability is then given by (10,000 - 4746)/10,000 = 0.525.

A second run (with repair disabled) was conducted to obtain MBTCF. A long mission was specified to insure that a critical failure occurs for each run. The MBTCF is then given by the average time the block GT-12 stays in mode 2 (1340 hours).


A third run was made to obtain the MBTCF for an ultra reliable recovery unit. The failure rate of the R unit was changed from 0.2 X 10⁻⁸. The resulting system MBTCF is 1410 hours.








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DUNIT

Run 1

Run 1 was done to obtain the system reliability. A 1,000 hour mission was selected.

SIMULATION RESULTS

Simulation name: exa5
Rumber of simulation runs: 10060
Single run duration: 1000.000
Rumber of monitored primitives: 11
Random number seed: 12345

	44	•		***	9							an a	fdet	Cail	45	0.7	fdet	fail	63	63	fail	dn dn	two	900	two	900	two	900	AVAILABILITY GRAVAILABILITY BELIABILITY		.36208140E-01 3.63791860E-01 3.69200000E-01	9.99999906K-01	3.6888544E-02 9.63111146E-01 1.0000000E+00	3.26902915E-01 6.73097085E-01 1.08860888+08	6.26674542E-01 3.7332545BE-01 3.6060000E-01	9.99999058-01	9.62112601E-01	6.645620338-01			_	19-17-17-17-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-18-	5.79118022E-01 4.20881978E-01 2.98490000E-01	6.47171670E-01	.80536520E-02 9.31946348E-01 1.0000000E+08	
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THANKS TATOR		-	control 2	delay/warmup 2	control	control	feilure	Control	4		201100	control	control 1	failure	control 2	control	control 1	fallure 1	control 2	control	fellure	control 2	control 1	control 2	control	control 2	control	control 3	HODE AVERAGE		1 6.368+02 3	2 9.42E-05 2		4 3.27E+02 3	1 6.278+02 3		3 3.798+01					1000000	1 5.798+02 1	2 3.53K+02 3	3 6.61E+01 2	•
HO MANE	2 040 4						3 ocate						4 dumit				5 dunit						9 40		10 gt		12 gt		PRIMITIVE	HO HANE	2 punit	•			3 public	,			47-17-4	, ,			5 dunit			,

	~	9.158+01		2.297879468+00	0 00+1	9.149009628-02	9.055099028-01	1.000000000001
9 46		1.67E+02 0.33E+02		2.60326646E+90 2.60326648E+00	0 00+1	1.671311698-01 0.32868833E-01	8.32868831E-01 1.67131167E-01	1.000000000000000000000000000000000000
10 gt	~ ~	6.85E+01 9.32E+02		1.64053576E+90 1.84053576E+00	1400 1681	6.84913628K-02 9.31508638K-01	9.31508637E-01 6.84913621E-02	1.00000000E+00 8.31900000E-01
12 gt		2.06E+02 7.94E+02		2.80305839K+60 2.80305839K+00	1+00 4746	2.06450975E-01 7.93549027E-01	7.93549625E-01 2.06456973E-01	1.6066660E+68 5.2546666E-61
PRINITIVE	T.	H8. TOT	AL BO	1 BO	HEAS TIME	RELIABILITY	UBBELIABILITY	!
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	~	~	954		1.055+04	9.0460000B-01	9.54666660E-02	~
	~	-	•	•	1.00E+03	1.0000000E+00	8 - 80000000E+06	•
	∢.	٦,	0		1.006+03	1.00000000011	00+M00000000.0	•
o punt	- ~	•	5432		1.646+03	4 . 568000000E-01	5.43200000K-01	-
	~	-	962		1.94E+04	9.03000008-01	-	
	•	-	•	•	1.00E+03	1.0000000E+00	_	•
	•	-	•		1.06E+03	1.0000000E+00	0 · 00000000 · 0	•
4 dunit	-	~	5798		1.728+03	4 . 2020000E-01	S. 79800000E-01	
	٠,	"	1151	1151	6 . 69E+03	8 . 8 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 E - 0 1		
	~ ~	٠.	•	• •	1.005+63	1.0000000000001		B 63
5 dumit	-	~	5174	5874	1.706+03	4.1260000E-01	S.87400000E-01	
		-	1136	1134	8.79E+03	8.8620000E-01	1.136000000-01	
	~	_	•	•	1.00E+03	1.00000000E+00	0 · 00000000 · 0	•
	-	~	۰		1.00E+03	1.0000000E+00	0.00000000000	•
	-	~	1797	1797	5.56E+03	8.2030000E-01	1.7970000E-0;	-
	~	-	•	•	1.00E+03	1.00000000E+00	0.00000000 .	
9 4	-	~	•		1.00E+03	1.0000000E+00	0.4000000000000	
	~	-	101	***	2.47E+03	5.9560000E-01	•	-
18 gt	~	~	•		1.00E+03	1.0000000E+00	_	•
	~		161	1681	5.95E+03	8.31900000E-01	-	-
12 gt	(~ .	1		1.00E+03	1.00000000000	_	•
	N	~	9 1 4 9	9749	2.115+03	S. 25400000E-01	4.74600000R-61	

Run 2

Run 2 obtains the system MBTCF. A long mission (100,000 hours) was specified.

SINULATION RESULTS

Simulation name: era5
Muber of simulation runs: 10000
Single run duration: 100000.0
Humber of monitored printitives: 11
Random number seed: 12345

MO MANE 3 punit 4 dunit 5 dunit 6 r 9 gt 12 gt 12 gt 2 gt 3 punit 7 dunit 6 dunit	### ##################################	PROM MODE(BO/BAME) 1 UU 2 EE 2 EE 2 EE 2 EE 3 EE 3 EE 3 EE 3 E	9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9	A DOE (BO/BAME) 2 Et 2 Et 3 EE 4 EE 5 EE 5 EE 5 EE 6	UMAVAILABILITY 9.898775618-01 7.102041778-01 7.10204178-01 2.91910278-01 7.242999978-01 7.24299998-01 9.915691168-01 1.749011998-01 1.749011998-01
s dumit	3 8.35E+02 2 8.28E+04 3 1.64E+04		10000	0.27984447E-01 0.27984447E-01 1.63701690E-01	9.916861378-01 1.72015553E-01 8.362983108-01
•			• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	1000000	

BELIABILITY

1.8000000K+09 1.8000000K+09 1.8000000K+09 0.000000000.0

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	PATE S	W. 318488 6.346734738461	•	TA-950770000.6	00+400000000.1 10-50010/500.0
9 gt	1 9.858+04	1.13733826E+01 1.13733835E+01	+01 1000e	9.84926270E-01 1.50737300E-02	1.50737297E-02 1.0000000E+00 9.84926270E-01 0.00000000E+00
10 gt	1 4.428+04 2 5.568+64	4.69325287K+82 4.89325287K+02	182	4,418325288-01 5,581674738-01	
12 gt	1 9.878+04 2 T. 348+03	1.86985880K+81 1.86985890K+01	101 1000	9.86577931E-01 1.34220699E-02	1.34226695E-02 1.0000000EF+00 9.86577930E-01 0.0000000EF+00
2 A Z 1 Z 2 Z 2 Z 2 Z 2 Z 2 Z 2 Z 2 Z 2 Z 2	TRAES. TOTAL NO NOM-SERO	No Bos-Sgro	MEAS TIME	BELIABILITY	UPRELIABILITY
2 punit	2 2 2	· ~	1.002+05	8.800000000.	1.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
	~ .	7132 7132	1.404.05	2.86800000E-01	7.132666668~41 2.86866668~41
	• ~		1.00E+05	1.000000000	00+H04000000.0
		Ī	1.00K+05	1.000000001+00	
	7 7 7	7194 7194	1.396+03	2 . 6660000K-61	7.19400000K-01
			3.566+05	7.19400000E-01	2.8060000E-01
	4 6	•	1.006+05	1.0000000E+00	6.00000000 +000
4 1 1 1 4	•		2.00E+05	2.0000000000.	
	•		5.968+05	8.3230000K-01	1.67900008-01
	. ~		1.00E+05	1.000000E+00	0 . 00000000 + 80
	7 (1.00E+05	1.000000E+00	0.0000000E+00
S dust	7	_	1.202+05	1.65100000K-01	B. 34900008-01
)	1691 1691	6.06E+05	8.34900008-61	1.651000008-01
	~	•	1 . 00K+05	1 . 00000000K+08	
			1.00E+05	1 .0000000E+00	
1. .	1 2 10000	1000	1.002+05	9 · 000000000K+00	1.00000000E+04
	7 7	•	1.00E+05	1.0000000E+00	
26.0	~	_	1.006+05	1 . 80660000E+00	# · 00000000 + • •
	2 1 10000	1900	1.00E+05	8 . 00000000 · 8	7 . 60600000E+06
10 44	7		1.002+05	1.00000008+00	0.00000000 +00
	7 7 7	1492 4492	2.23E+05	S. 500000000-01	4 . 4920000E-01
12 gt	****	•	1.008+05	1.0000000E+00	
			r 0 + 11 7 0		

Run 3

Run 3 was a modified system which had a highly reliable "R" unit. The resulting MBTCF was higher because there were less system failures caused by the failure to switch out detected failures.


SIMULATION RESULTS

Simulation name: ena5 Mumber of simulation runs: 10000 Bingle run duration: 10000.0 Humber of monitored printites: 11 Random number seed: 12145

PRIMITIVE DESCR	DESCR.	TRANSITION	TRANSITION AND NODE DESCRIPTION	DE DESC	RIPTION		
BO HAME		TYPE	PROM NODE (NO/NAME)		TO MODE (NO/NAME)	-	
2 public		fallure	1 up		2 ft		
		control	2 ft		4 of f		
		delay/warmup	2 ft		3		
		control	3 4 6		97 1		
		control	4 off		9		
3 public		failure	1 40		2 ft		
		control	2 gt		4 of		
		delay/vermup	2 ft		3 65		
		control	3 . £		T up		
		control	4 off		1 up		
4 dunit		control	l up		2 fdet		
		failure	1 40		3 641		
		control	2 fdet		an T		
		control	3 Cott		9		
9 dumit		control	1 00		2 fdet		
		fatture	T up		3 Cail		
		control	2 fdet		- an 1		
		control	3 fail				
		failure	1 40		2 5411		
		control	2 (811		40		
9 94		control	1 one		2 two		
		control	2 two		1 000		
10 gt		control	1 one		2 540		
		control	2 140		P one		
12 gt		control	1 one		2 two		
		control	2 two		1 one		
PRIMITIVE		HODE AVERAGE	STANDARD	O-MON	AVAILABILITA	VET TABLE TANABLE	
NO NAME				RUNS			1177107744
2 pumbt		1.01	1.01953926E+01		1.01224346E-62		***************************************
		2 1.652-04			1.645141608-09		
		3 1.658+04		•	1.64780759K-01	E. 35219241E-01	
		4 4.256+04	3.70711914E+02	•	8.25096801E-01	1.749031998-01	1 . 0000000E+00
3 public		1 9.918402	1 003481348401	000			
		2 1.622-04			1 617759708-00	101111111111111111111111111111111111111	
		3 1.628+04			10-14000010109		90+900000000000000000000000000000000000
		4 8.288+04	3.682772526+02	•	27944477	10-300000000000000000000000000000000000	99+¥9999999999999999999999999999999999
				•	70-9/57766.4.4	10-16667077	7 - 00 - 00 - 00 - 00 - 00 - 00 - 00 -
4 dumit		1 0.436+02		10000	8.43066359K-03	9.91569336K-01	0.000000000
		2 8.25E+04	3.70711914E+02	•	8.25096801E-01	1.749031998-03	1 00000000
		3 1.668+04	1.70616577E+02	•	1.664725358-01	8.33527465E-01	1 . 0000000E+00
4717							
		70+917:0 1	DO-MANAGER D. D.	00001	6.313663256-03	9.916861372-01	0 . 00000000 + 00
		3 1.64R+04	3.68142181E+02		1.63701690K-01	1.720155535-01	1.00000000H+66
				•			
•		1 1.00E+05	2.31072807K+00	~	9.99976446E-01	2.35544219E-05	9.9960000E-01

	,	,	;	•	,	•			•	•	,				;		į					
	•	•	7.308+00	2	•	770		00+9/087/076.7	2	•	2.3	274	2.355442198-05				9.999764468-01		8	1.0000000000	00+3	
9 gt	-		9.85E+04	=	=	137	3362	1.13733826E+01	=	•	•	4926	. 64926272E-01	10-	1.50	13720	1.50737281E-02		00.	1.0000000E+00	00+3	
	~	3.5	1.51E+03	2	=	137	3	1.13733826E+01	7	10000	7.5	0737	1.50737284K-02	-02		92627	9.84926272E-01		8	0 . 00000000K+00	00 ±	
10 gt	 -	0.0	3.00E+04	7.3		522	286	1.52278503E+02	~:	0 5		5577	.99577509E-01	7	7.00	1224	7.00422491E-01			1.0000000E+00	00+1	
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12 gt	-~	I.	10.311.7	1 2		097	22	1.09782743E+01 1.09782753E+01	= =	10000	• -	5851	9.85851640E-01 1.41483605E-02	77	1.41	3158	1.41483601E-02 9.85851640E-01			1.0000000E+00 0.0000000E+00		
	•	l)																		
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	E	2	õ	ž	7		RUES	2	Ë	BETW TRMS												
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	~	_		1679	•		1679	•	5.9	. 96E+05	-	3210	. 32100000K-01	10-1	_	1990	.6790000E-0	5				
	-	-			0			•		. 00E+05	=	900	0000	1.00000000E+00	•	00000	.0000000000.	0				
	•	-			•			•	-	.00E+05	=	9	0000	1.00000000E+00	•	00000	.0000000000000	00				
3 punit	-	~	_	10000	2		10000	2	-	.002+05	•	0000	0000	0.00000000000000	=	00000		9				
	~	•		636	•		1349	2	7:	. 20E+05	-	6510	0000	1.65100000E-01	-	34960	. 34960000E-01	10-				
	~	~		1691	=		163	=	•	. 966+05	•	3490	. 34900000E-01	TO-3	=	65100	.65100000E-01	70-			-	
	_	-			•			•	-	.00E+05	=	9000	. 00000000E+00	00+1	•	00000		00			-	
	•	-			•			•		. 00K+05	=	000	.00000000E+66	E+00	•	00000	. 00000000K+00	00				
4 dunit	-	~		1351	=		1321	=	7:	. 20E+05	-	6790	. 6790000E-01	E-01	•	32100	. 32100000E-01	5				
	-	~		1679	•		1679	•		.968+05	-	3210	. 32100000E-01	E-01	-	67900	. 6790000E-01	50				
	~	-			•				:	. 00E+05	-	000	1.000000000.1	E+08	•	00000	0000000000	9				
	~	-			•			•	-	. 00E+05	=	0000	0000	.00000000E+00	•	00000	.0000000000.	00				
5 dualt	-	~		::	•		1343	•	7	. 20K+05	-	6510	.65100000E-01	E-01	•	1110	. 3494000E-01	5				
	-	~		1651	=		1651	=	:	.06E+05	•	3490	. 34900000E-61	E-01	=	9169	.65100000E-01	10.				
	~	-			•			•	:	.00E+05	=	0000	0000	1.0000000000+00	•	00000	.000000000.	00				
	~	-			•				-	. 005+05	=	0000	. 00000000E+08	10+3	•	00000	.00000000000	00				
	-	~			~			~	3	.001-00	•	:	0000	. 9980000E-01	~	0000	.000000000.	10.				
	~	-			•			•	-	. 80K+05	-	0000	0000	.000000000E+00	•	0000	.0000000000.	00				
9 41		~			0			•	:	.005+05	-	000	0000	.00000000E+00	•	00000	.0000000000.	00				
	~	-	_	00001	2		10000	•	-		•	0000	9000	9.000000000000	-	00000	.000000000000					
10 gt	-	~			•			•	-	. 00E+05	-	9	0000	1.000000000.1	•	9000	.000000000	9				
	~	-		3050	2		3050	•	~	. 28E+05	•	9500	0000	6.95000000E-01	_	5600	. 0 5 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 E - 0 1	5				
12 96	-	~			•			•	-		-		9000	1.00000000E+00	•	0000	. 00000000E+00	ë				
	~	-	_	00001	9	•	00001	2	-	20+100.	ď	0000	0.000000000000000	E+00	=	00000	**************************************	991				

Example 6: Active Redundancy (Dissimiliar Failure Rates and Nested Redundancy). Repair Philosophy Assume that corrective repair is deferred until a critical failure occurs.



 $\lambda_A = 70 \text{ failures}/10^6 \text{ Hzs}$

 $\lambda_{B1} = 50 \text{ failures}/10^6 \text{ Hrs}$

 $\lambda_{B2} = \lambda_{B3}$ -70 failures/ 10^6 Hrs

 $\lambda_{C6}=50$ failures/ 10^6 Hrs $\lambda_{C1} = \lambda_{C2}$

 $\lambda_{D6}=60$ failures/ 10^6 Hrs $\lambda_{D1} = \lambda_{D2}$

Compute:

1. MTBCF

2. Reliability at time $t\approx720~\mathrm{Hr}$

Example 6

This system shows an example of multiple failure rates in series/parallel systems. For the system to operate, the A unit must be up, the B-Group must be up (1 out of 3) and either the C-Group or the D-Group must be up.

Figure 6-1 shows the top level diagram for this system. The blocks A, B, C, and D represent the system components and the detailed diagrams are shown in figures 6-2 through 6-4. Each component has a repair trigger which is reset by the RP block. the RP block is triggered by block GT-12.

The B-Group (see figure 6-3) is modeled using several modes which define which B subunit fails.

The C and D groups are modeled in a similar fashion. However, the model is simpler because all subunits have the same failure rate. If all subunits have the same failure rate, the details of which subunit fails may not be required. Since a critical failure occurs after the fourth failure and the block will be repaired, the nodes with 1 or 2 subunits up are not modeled.

The simulation in figure 6-1 was run for 100,000 missions with 720 hours/ mission to compute the reliability. To compute the MBTCF, a long run (100,000 hours) was conducted.

The reliability after 720 hours is obtained from GT-12. A value of 0.9518 is obtained. The MTBCF from the 100,000 hour run was 9690 hours.

Other repair methods can be simulated by modification of the top level diagram. For example, repair of each group can be carried out only when the group fails. This could be done using an RP block for each group (A, B, C or D). In this case the RP block would be driven by a GT block which itself is driven by the group output.






Figure 6-1

A - Unit



 $\lambda = 70 \text{ E-6}$


Figure 6-2



Output for all nodes is a 2 except for node "fail". Node "fail" output is 1.0.

Figure 6-3

C Unit and D Unit



 λ = 50 E-6 for C unit

 λ = 60 E-6 for D unit

Figure 6-4

SIMULATION RESULTS

Musher of minulation russ: 10000 Musher of mountered printings: Mandom number seed: 12345 MANE TRAMSIT MO MANE CONTROL 2 rp CONTROL 4 b CONTROL 4 b CONTROL 6 a lure 6 a lu	Table tives: 11 Table tives: 11 Table tives: 11 Table tive Control TRAMSSITION AND MODE PROM MODE (NO/NAME) 1 rep 1 fell 2 ulp 2 ulp 2 ul23 2 ul23 2 ul23 3 ula 6 ulb 6 ulb 9 ul23 9 ul23 10 ulb 10 ull 11 ull 12 ul23 2 ul23 3 ula 4 ula 6 ulb 6 ulb 6 ulb 7 ulb 8 ull 10 ull 11 ull 12 ull 13 ull 14 ull 15 ull 16 ull 17 ull 18 ull 18 ull 19 ull 10 ull 10 ull 11 ull 12 ull 13 ull 14 ull 15 ull 16 ull 16 ull 17 ull 18 ulll 18 ull 18 ull 18 ull 18 ull 18 ull 18 ull 18 ull 18 ull			
			7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7 7	
		2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 1		
PRINITIVE BO MANE 2 FP	HODE AVERAGE BO TINE 1 4.91E-05 2 7.20E+02	STAMDARD DEVIATION 6.97611426E-07 6.86447720E-07	MON-0 AVAILABILITY RUNS 4820 6.81961566E-08 4820 9.9999932E-01	UMAVAILABILITY 9.99999932E-01 6.80720237E-08
	1 0.00E+00 2 7.20E+02	0 0.000000000K+00 2 9.76562475K-09	4808 0.00000000R+00	1.00000000E+00 -1.19504643E-10

9.99880000E-01 8.7169000E-01 9.9996000E-01

0.00000000E+00 1.0000000E+00 9.33916970E-01 6.60830298E-02 2.70977577E-04 9.99729022E-01

12831

0.000000000E+00 4.57601607E-01 2.71289553E-02

0.00E+00 6.72E+02 1.95E-01

4

9.51800000E-01 9.51800000E-01

RELIABILITY

9.51920000K-01 9.51920000K-01

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63E-02 74E-02 19E-02 10SE-02 10SE-02 11SE-01 102 10E-01 10E-01	92E-03 0 82E-01 19288 98E-02 3 51E-01 69	07E-03 0 89E-01 22813 130E-02 5 155E-01 124 04E-01 2419	100E+00 4820	100E+00 0	100E+00 4820	ZERO MEAN TINE 4820 1 462404 4820 1 462404 4820 1 462404 4820 1 472404 4820 1 472404 4820 1 472404 4820 1 472404 4820 1 472404 4820 1 472404 4820 1 88204 4820 1 88204 4734 1 88204 4734 1 88204 1 7.202407 1 7.202407 1 7.202407 1 9.36246 8 9 8 0.9224 8 9 8 0.9224 8 9 8 0.92408 1731 4 162406 8 1.262408 1731 4 162408
2.05E-01 2.76924763E-02 2.09E-01 3.10794674E-02 1.96E-01 2.59966049E-02 2.09E-01 3.27289589E-02 1.68E-01 2.43053902E-02 1.20E+01 2.4053902E-01 1.72E+01 2.4664919E-01 1.70E+01 2.46698210E-01	2.91E-03 1.61847392E-03 6.48E+02 5.47498882E-01 1.61E-01 2.1685098E-02 4.19E+00 1.21623851E-01 6.76E+01 5.23845911E-01	8.42E-03 4.67100507E-03 6.34E+02 5.90299189E-01 1.98E-01 2.31346930E-02 5.84E+00 1.4394855E-01 7.99E+01 5.61347604E-01	0.00E+40 0.000000000E+00 7.20E+42 9.76562475E-09	0.00K+40 0.000000000K+00 7.20K+42 0.00000000K+00	0.00E+00 0.00000000E+00 7.20E+02 9.76562475E-09	TOTAL NO NOM-ZERO OCCURNCS 4800 4926 4826 4914 4808 4914 4808 4914 4808 4914 4808 4914 4808 112 128 11 1 1 17 77 77 77 77 77 899 89 117 117 77 77 899 89 117 117 77 899 89
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1.448+07	5.818+05	2.98E+04	1.468+04	1.46E+04	7.20E+02	7.208+02	1.465+04	1.468+04	
'n	124	2419	4.6.20	4.8.20	•	•	4820	4820	
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9 gt 10 gt 12 gt

System Reliability for 720 hour mission

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Mumber of monitored p	primitives: 11 12345	_				
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	failure	1			Julb	
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12 gt	control		cone two		1 one	
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	•	•	7017777777		10-207/16076-1	10-47/70CC.C.D
a	4 6	7.00E+04 5.23E+03	1.92768036E+02 5.25273056E+01		6.99547007E-01 5.22738044E-02	3.00452993E-01 9.47726196E-01
		. 66E+03	7.00491409E+01	1325	1.87620265E-02	9.81237974E-01

(Repair Deactivated)

SIMULATION RESULTS

1.000000000x+00 0.00000000x+00 4.67500000x-01

0.000000000E+00

RELIABILITY


1.00000000E+00

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```

9 gt 10 gt 12 gt

Example 7: A More Complex System (Multiple Mission Phases) - All Active Redundancy. Repair Philosophy Assume that corrective repair is deferred until a critical failure occurs.



Phase 1 (T = 10Hr)

 $\lambda_{A1} = \lambda_{A2} = \dots \lambda_{A5} = 100 \text{ failures/}10^6 \text{ Hr}$

 $\lambda_{B1} = \lambda_{B2} = \dots \ \lambda_{B6} = 50 \ \mathrm{failures}/10^6 \ \mathrm{Hr}$

 $\lambda_{C1} = \lambda_{C2} = \dots \lambda_{C21} = 75 \text{ failures}/10^6 \text{ Hr}$

Phase 2 (T = 5 Hr)

 $\lambda_{A1} = \lambda_{A2} = \dots \lambda_{A5} = 200 \text{ failures}/10^6 \text{ Hz}$

 $\lambda_{B1} = \lambda_{B2} = \dots \ \lambda_{B6} = 25 \ \mathrm{failures}/10^6 \ \mathrm{Hr}$

 $\lambda_{C1} = \lambda_{C2} = \dots \lambda_{C21} = 50 \text{ failures}/10^6 \text{ Hz}$

Phase 3 (T = 2 Hr)

 $\lambda_{A1} = \lambda_{A2} = \dots \ \lambda_{A5} = 75 \ \mathrm{failures/10^6 \ Hr}$

 $\lambda_{B1} = \lambda_{B2} = \dots \ \lambda_{B6} = 75 \ \mathrm{failures}/10^6 \ \mathrm{Hr}$

 $\lambda_{C1} = \lambda_{C2} = \dots \lambda_{C21} = 25 \text{ failures}/10^6 \text{ Hr}$

Reliability at each Phase (T = 10, 15, 17)

Example 7

The overall system is composed of three types of subunits (called A, B and C) which are in series and parallel configurations. Each subunit has a mission time dependent failure rate. The overall system operation requires the following:

A-Group (one out of five A units must be up)
B-Group (five out of six B units must be up)
C-Group (one out of three C subgroups must be up)

By inspection of the system diagrams, the greatest contribution to system failure is the B-Group. This is because system failure occurs after only two B unit failures. In constrast, it takes five A unit failures for system failure to occur. The C-Group is more complex because of the series and parallel nature. However, since all three C-subgroups must fail to cause system failure, the C-group is expected to have a small contribution to the system failure rate.

The FASTER diagram for the system is shown in four figures due to the large number of blocks required. The first two diagrams 7-1 and 7-2 show the A-Group, B-Group and C-Group in detail. Figure 7-3 shows the structure of the A, B and C primitives which have mission dependent failure rates. For the A and B groups each unit outputs a zero (0) if it is up and a one (1) if it fails. All outputs are added together and a threshold primitive changes mode when a certain number of failures occur. The C units output a two (2) when they are up and a one (1) when they fail. A combination of ANDS and ORS are used to define C group operation. Figure 7-4 shows the overall system diagram. For the system to be operational, all three groups (A, B and C) must be operational. Timer blocks (GT) are used to keep track of system operation. The TRS and TRSA blocks are threshold blocks which output a fail value (1) when the number of failures (which is an input) exceeds a threshold value. For this example, the threshold value for TRS is 4.5 (which outputs a "1" after five failures) and the threshold for TRSA is 1.5 (which outputs a "1" after two failures).

Example 7 shows a case where a unique well defined value for MTBCF does not exist. This is because of the time dependence of the critical failure rate (see example 4 comment) and the mission dependent subunit failure rate. As discussed in example 4, a time dependent failure rate requires a long mission time. However, the failure rates for the primitive subunits are not defined beyond 17 hours. Only if assumptions about the failure rates beyond 17 hours are made can an MTBCF be computed using a long mission. For this reason, MTBCF values are not obtained for example 7.

Results for a 17 hour mission are obtained using 100,000 runs. Inspection of these results show that the number of individual unit failures compare with results which can be ob-

tained by a simple calculation. For example, in phase one (10 hours) with 100,000 runs the total time is 1,000,000 hours. The expected total numbers of failures are: 100 for A units, 50 for B units, and 75 for C units. The FASTER output predicts these values as the number of transitions from mode 1 to mode 4 for AU, BU and CU. Within statistics, these values agree with expected results.

The FASTER output shows that only one critical failure occurs in 100,000 missions. This failure was due to failure of the B Group. The other groups contribute to the failure rate but their contribution is much less.

A much greater number of runs is needed to obtain good statistics. Due to the complexity of the FASTER diagram and the amount of computer time needed, this was not done. Instead, a simplified diagram containing only the B-Group was run.

To demonstrate that the Λ and C groups do not make a significant contribution to the system failure, a set of 10,000 runs each of 3,000 hours was run. This insures that multiple failures occur. The blocks GT-65, GT 66 and GT-67 give the numbers of system failures caused by Λ-Group (21) B-Group (2467) and G-Group (0). As the run time is decreased to 17 hours, the contributions of C and Λ become even smaller when compared to B.

The FASTER results for B. Group evaluation show that for a 17 hour mission, there were only 7 failures in 500,000 missions. This gives a reliability of 0.999986. Even higher reliability values are obtained for 10 and 15 hour missions.

An estimate of the B-Group failure rate can be made using the binomial distribution. Assuming a 20 hour mission and a failure rate of 50 X 10⁻⁶ per hour, the probability of a B unit failure during the mission is 10⁻³. With six (6) B units, the binomial distribution gives the following:

$$P(1) = 6 \times 10^{-3}$$

$$P(2) = 15 \times 10^{-6}$$


$$P(3) = 20 \times 10^{-9}$$


$$P(4) = 15 \times 10^{-12}$$

$$P(5) = 6 \times 10^{-15}$$

 $P(6) = 1 \times 10^{-19}$

The FASTER output for the 17 hour mission shows a total number of B unit failures of 2400 which gives a probability of failure of 4.8×10^{-3} . Since only 7 system failures occur, (two or more B units fail), the failure probability is 14×10^{-6} . These values are similar to the estimated values.










Figure 7-2







SIMULATION RESULTS

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	~ •	2.00E+00 1.67E-02	2.64556969E-04 1.31659245E-03	-0	1.17404332E-01 9.81285453E-04	8.82595668E-01 9.99018715E-01	9.99820000E-01 1.00000000E+00
3 4 6	- 77	1.00E+01	5.72757970E-04 5.60774526E-04	100000	5.87947599E-01 2.93696424E-01	4.12~42401E-01 7.06303576E-01	0.000000000E+00
	m ->	2.00E+00 1.62E-02	2.85408547E~04 1.30131852E~03	: °	1.17404663E-01 9.51313221E-04	8.82595337E-01 9.99048687E-01	9.996900000E-01
3 •	~	9.996+00	6.15857e00E-04 5.65549184E-04	1000001	5.879151845-01	4.12084816E-01	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
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77 6	٦,	4.43L+00	6.22811262E-04	100000	5.879019+5E-01	4.12098055E-01	0.0000000E+00
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3 4		9.99E+00	10-305516116.5	100000	5.879261u3E-01	4.120738378-01	0.0000000000000
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11 cen	→ №	1.70E+01 0.00E+00	0.000000000E+00	00	1.003000000E+00	0.00000000E+00	1.000000000£+00
12 bu		1.005+01		100000	5.88092198E-01	1.119078026-01	0.000000000000
	***	2.00E+00 7.05E-03	1.73077293E-04 6.91406613E-04	2 ~ °	1.33937996E-01 1.17554884E-01 4.14922176E-04	7.05052004E-01 8.82445116E-01 9.99585078E-01	5.500000000E-04 9.99790000E-01 1.00000000E+00
13 bu	- ~	1.002+01	4.202231946-04 3.63846018E-04	100000	5.880833338-01	4.119166672-01	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
	~ •	2.00E+00 6.86E-03	1.68389146E-04 8.99987877E-04	~ °	1.17559260E-01 4.03418406E-04	8.82440740E-01 9.99596582E-01	9.99760000E-01
1 b t	N	1.00E+01 5.00E+00	4.10272827E-04 3.59177677E-04	100000	5.88090080E-01	4.11909920E-01	0.00000000E+00
	m =	2.00E+00 6.40E-03	1.574746572-04	20	1.17572214E-01 3.76382230E-04	8.82427746E-01 9.99623618E-01	9.99880000E-01
15 bu	4.	1.008+01	3.86288157E-04	100000	5.88102646E-01	4.118973546-01	0.0000000E+00
	ı n ≠	1.00E+00 6.03E-03	1.56402981E-04 B.42198322E-04		1.17573220E-01 3.54586790E-04	4.82426780E-01 9.99645413E-01	1.0000000E-01 1.0000000E+00
7 P F	4 ^	1.008+01	3.81901249E-04	100000	5.88096902E-01	4.11903098E-01	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
	• ~ •	2.00K+00 6.09K-03	1.70661981E-04 8.76845035E-04		1.17554074E-01 4.05075221E-04	6.62441922E-01 9.99594925E-01	9.596366665-01 1.60606665-01
17 bu	- 7	1.00E+01 5.00E+00	4.09014581E-04 100000 3.75040894E-04 99948	100000	5.88087495K-01 2.93946263K-01	4.11912505E-01 7.06053737E-01	0.00000000E+00

	3 2.00E+00 4 6.86E-03	1.66449492E-04 8.96467885E-04	70	1,17562559E-01 4,03682940E-04	8.82437441E-01 9.99596317E-01	9.99860000E-01
23 tree	1 1.70E+01 2 4.40E-07	 4.40290194E-07	→ 0	9.99999974E-01 2.58995505E-08	2.58995505E-08 9.99999974E-01	9.99990000E-01
24 cu	1 1.00E+01 2 4.99E+00 3 2.00E+00 4 1.19E-02	5.53986174E-04 4.94570180E-04 2.10980477E-04 1.19847723E-03	100000	5.87966989E-01 2.93819617E-01 1.17515720E-01 6.97673935E-04	4.12033011E-01 7.06180383E-01 8.82484280E-01 9.99302326E-01	0.00000000000000 9.00000000000000000000
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7 ° ° 2	1 1.004+01 2 4.99E+00 3 2.00E+00 4 1.18E-02	5,21210721E-04 4,98732785E-04 2,1686964E-04 1,1699805E-03	0 60666 000001	5.87985955E-01 2.91810;88E-01 1.17507167E-01 6.36389785E-04	4.12014045E-01 7.06189512E-01 8.82492833E-01 9.99303610E-01	0.00000000E+00 9.10000000E-01 9.9950000E-01
. C. S.	1 1.00E+01 2 5.00E+00 3 2.00E+00 4 8.94E-03	 1,75630950E-04 1,29121981E-04 1,38589198E-04 1,02762587E-03	000001 \$1666 1	5.88014334E-01 2.93888084E-01 1.17541548E-01 5.26034042E-04	4.11955ucbE-01 7.06111916E-01 8.82458452E-01 9.99473966E-01	0.00000000E+00 6.50000000E-04 9.9997000E-01 1.0000000E+00
77 - en en	1 1 60E+01 2 5.00E+00 3 2.00E+00 4 9.01E-03	1,434c5920E-64 4,370c2263E-04 1,93187792E-04 1,01156393E-03	0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	5.88050908E-01 2.93882.50E-01 1.17536677E-01 5.29964933E-04	4.11949092E-01 7.06117550E-01 8.8246332M-01 9.99470035E-01	0.00000000E+00 7.00000000E-01 9.9996000E-01 1.0000000E+00
39 cu	1 1.00£+01 2 4.99£+00 3 2.00£+00 4 1.23£-02	5.94825135E-04 4.93906380E-04 2.14829633E-04 1.23752863E-03	100000 \$1665 6	5.87948051E-01 2.93816332E-01 1.17509606E-01 7.26010899E-04	4.12051949E-01 7.0618366E-01 8.82490394E-01 9.99273989E-01	0.00000000E+00 8.50000000E-01 9.9910000E-01 1.0000000E+00
30 сы	1 1.00E+02 2 5.00E+00 3 2.00E+00 4 9.46E-03	4.62941069E-04 4.46521749E-04 1.94629873E-04 1.04787550E-03	100000 100000 1	5.68031945E-01 2.93875219E-01 1.17535042E-01 5.57793478E-04	4.11968055K-01 7.06124781K-01 8.82464956K-01 9.99442207K-01	0.00000000E+00 7.2000000E-04 9.9970000E-01 1.0000000E+00
37 cu	1 1.00E+01 2 5.00E+00 3 2.00E+00 4 8.41E-03	4,67639853E-04 4,13806963E-04 1,81755604E-04 1,00387621E-03	100000 99937 7	5.88049711E-01 2.93906512E-01 1.17548908E-01 4.94869753E-04	4.11950289E-01 7.06083488E-01 8.82451092E-01 9.99505130E-02	0.00000000K+00 6.3000000K-04 9.9930000K-01 1.0000000K+00
30 Cu	1 1.00E+01 2 5.00E+00 3 2.00E+00 4 8.56E-03	4.61499818E-04 4.16344730E-04 1.86370511E-04 1.00547215E-03	100000	5.88048619E-01 2.93902794E-01 1.17544072E-01 5.04514342E-04	4.119513818-01 7.060972068-01 8.824559288-01 9.994954868-01	0.00000000R+00 6.2000000R-04 9.99970000E-01 1.0000000E+00
39 Cu	1 1.00E+01 2 5.00E+00 3 2.00E+00 4 1.05E-02	4.85930970E-04 4.69329418E-04 2.08435523E-04 1.09257072E-03	100000 99920 7	5.88021231E-01 2.93845447E-01 1.17517854E-01 6.15468109E-04	4.11978789E-01 7.06154551E-01 8.82482146E-01 9.99384532E-01	0.00000000K+00 6.0000000K-04 9.9930000K-01 1.0000000K+00
40 cu	1 1.00E+01 2 5.00E+00 3 2.00E+00 4 1.06E-02	5,36474939E-04 4,55569534E-04 2,06813129E-04 1,13206729E-03	100000 99925 7	5.87996405E-01 2.93859387E-01 1.17519804E-01 6.24404150E-04	4.12003595E-01 7.06140613E-01 8.82480196E-01 9.99375596E-01	0.00000000K+00 7.50000000K-04 9.95930000K-01 1.00000000K+00

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• ~	5.005+00	4. 6706126-04	2000	2 038451105-01	7 061548B6-01	00+3000000000
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•	1.138-02	1.18735316E-03		6.67272201E-04		-
-	1 . 00E+01	5.58479398E-04	100000	5.879813216-01	4.12018679E-01	_
~	5.00E+00	3	98856	2.93864159E-01	7.061358418-01	-
•		2.02050855E-04	•	1.17525080E-01	8.82474920E-01	•
•	1.078-02	1.15526386E-03	0	6.29439898E-04	9.993705608-01	1.000000000.1
-	1.00E+01	5.10087062E-04	100000	5.88007899E-01	4.11992101E-01	00.000000000000000000000000000000000000
~	5.00E+00	4.55302623E-04	6666	2.93862726E-01	7.06137274E-01	7.3000000E-04
•	•	2.02237963E-04		1.1/525523E-01	8.82474477E-01	9.99940000E-01
•	1.036-02	1.105559416-03	•	6.03851958E-04	9.9939614BE-01	1.0000000000.1
-	1.006+01	5.712527206-04	100000	5.479513476-01	4.12048653E-01	00-300000000000000000000000000000000000
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7	1.26E-02	1.228408546-03	•	7.10543537E-04	9.99259456E-01	1.00000000E+00
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•	1.136-02	1.151138688-03	•	10-309616529.9	9.993374656-01	1.00000000E+00
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•	2.00E+00	2.229187446-04	s	1.17499494E-01	8.82500506E-01	10-300000000000
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	1.006+01	4.88215330K-04	100000	5.88012098E-01	4.11987902E-01	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
~		4.04166638E-04	99914	2.93633354E-01	7.06166642E-01	. 60000000E-04
~	•	2.03074174E-04	-	1.17524901E-01	8.82475099E-01	9.9960000E-01
•	1.078-02	1.112568316-03	•	6.29642441E-04	9.99370358E-01	1.00000000E+00
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-	66	66	1.725+04	9.990100001-01	•	
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27 Cu			. 59	2.628+04	10-300000E-6	- 0-300000000 y
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	~	53	23	7.396+04	9.99770000E-01	100000000
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70 05		00	9	2.13E+04		8.000000000.8
	ret (02666	99920	1.705+01	8.000000000.0.	9.99200000E-01
	~ (92 00	97	6.54E+04	9.99740000E-01	
	7	76266		1.705+01	1.06000000E-03	9.98940000K-01
40 62		` .	` <u>*</u>	2 225+03	9. 99930000E-01	7.0000000000
	1 44	99925	99925		7 5000000000000000000000000000000000000	9 99250000E-04
	~	1 29	7.9		9.99710000E-01	2.90000000E-04
	~	96866	96866	1.706+01	1.0400000E-03	9.98960000E-01
	~		۲ -		9.99930000E-01	7.00000000E-05
70	, in the second	17	77	2.21E+04	9.99230000E-01	7.70000000E-04
	→	2 99923	99923	1.706+01	7.70000000E-04	9.99230000E-01

C. C	1.70Ec04 9.99200000Ec01 1.70Ec04 9.992000000Ec01 9.992000000Ec01 9.992000000Ec01 9.992000000Ec01 9.992000000Ec01 9.992000000Ec01 9.992000000Ec01 9.99200000Ec01 9.99200000Ec01 9.9920000Ec01 9.992000Ec01 9.99200Ec01
C. C	1.10 1.00
C. C	1.10fc-01 9 9993500000000000000000000000000000000
C. C	1.10E+01
CL	2.136+05 3.136+04 4.992-10000066-01 1.906+04 4.992-10000066-01 2.136+04 3.106+06 3.106+06
C. C	2.30x+04 1.30x+04 1.30x+01 1.30x+01 2.30x+01 2.30x+01 2.30x+01 3.30x+01 3.30x+
CL	1.70E-01 1.3000000EE-01 2.30E-01 1.70E-01 1.70E-
CL	6.30E-04 9.99100000EE-01 1.70E-01 1.0000000EE-01 1.70E-04 9.991000000EE-01 1.70E-04 9.99100000EE-01 9.10000000EE-01 9.10000000EE-01 9.1000000EE-01 9.1000000EE-01 9.100000EE-01 9.10000EE-01 9.100000EE-01 9.10000EE-01 9.1000EE-01 9.1000EE-01 9.10000EE-01 9.10000EE-01 9.10000EE-01 9.1000E
C. C	1. \$76501 1. \$2000000000000000000000000000000000000
C. C	1.70f**01 9.99940000ff**01 9 9.9994000ff**01 9 9.9994000ff**01 9 9.9994000ff**01 9 9.9994000ff**01 9 9.999400ff**01 9 9.9994000ff**01 9 9.999400ff**01 9 9.9994000ff**01 9 9.999400ff**01 9 9.999400ff
CL C	1.102-01 9.10000000000000000000000000000000000
C. C	1.76F+01 9.9960000E-01 9.175F+01 9.175F+01 9.9960000E-01 9.175F+01 9.175F+01 9.9960000E-01 9.175F+01 9.175F+
CL	1.765.01 1.3000000E.01 5.3 1.465.05 9.9950000E.01 5.3 1.465.01 7.800000E.01 9.900000E.01 9.9000000E.01 9.9000000E.01 9.900000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.900000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.9000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.9000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.9000E.01 9.9000E.01 9.9000E.01 9.9000E.01 9.90000E.01 9.9000E.01 9.
Cu	1.10E+04 9.9950000E-01 3.10E+04 9.9950000E-01 7.10E+04 1.10E+04 1.10E+06 1.10E+01 1.10E+06 1.
CL	1.18E+04 9.9923000E-01 9.9923000E-01 9.000E-01
Cu	1.765+01 7.800000005-04 9. 1.765+04 1.200000005-01 1. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 1. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 1. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 1. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 1. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 1. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 2. 1.765+04 9.995+000005-01 3.
CL	\$.00E+04 9.9966000E-01 3. 1.70E+04 9.9960000E-01 9. 1.70E+04 9.9990000E-04 9. 1.70E+04 9.9990000E-04 9. 1.70E+04 9.9990000E-04 9. 1.70E+04 9.9990000E-01 9. 1.70E+04 9.9990000E-01 9. 1.70E+04 9.9910000E-01 9. 1.70E+04 9.9910000E-04 9. 1.70E+04 9.9910000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.9910000E-04 9. 1.70E+04 9.9910000E-04 9. 1.70E+04 9.9910000E-04 9. 1.70E+04 9.9910000E-04 9. 1.70E+04 9.9910000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.9910000E-04 9. 1.70E+04 9.9910000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.991000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.991000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.9910000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.991000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.9910000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.991000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.991000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.991000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.991000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.9910000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.991000E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.99100E-04 9. 2.6E+05 9.9910E-05 9. 2.6E+05 9.99100E-05 9. 2.6E+05 9
C.C. C.C. C.C. C.C. C.C. C.C. C.C. C.C	1.70E+01 1.1200000E-01 1.70E+01 1.70E+0
Cu	1.72E+01 9.9999000E-01 1.72E+01 9.50000E-01 1.72E+01 9.99930000E-01 9.50000E-01 9.50000E-0
Cu	1.70E-01 9.500000E-01 9 1.70E-01 1.70000E-01 9 1.70E-01 1.7000E-01 9 1.70E-01 1.70E-01 9 1.70E-01 1.70E-
Cu	1.70F-01 1.2200000E-01 5 1.02F-01 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9 9
Cu	1.70F-01 1.2200000F-03 99 1.200000F-01 1.200000F-01 1.200000F-01 1.2000000F-01 1.200000F-01 1.200000F-01 1.200000F-01 1.200000F-01 1.200000F-01 1.200000F-01 1.200000F-01 1.200000F-01 1.20000F-01 1.200000F-01 1.20000F-01 1.2000F-01 1.20000F-01 1.2000F-01 1.20000F-01 1.20
Cu	1.10f+0.5 9.99900000f-0.1 5 1.70f+0.4 9.99900000f-0.1 9 1.70f+0.4 9.99900000f-0.1 9 1.70f+0.4 9.99900000f-0.1 9 1.70f+0.4 9.9990000f-0.1 9 1.70f+0.4 9.999000f-0.1 9 1.70f+0.4 9 1.70f+
Cu	1.912-04 9.991100005-01 B 1.305-01 B 1.305-01 B 1.305-01 B 1.305-010005-01 B 1.305-01005-01 B 1.305-01 B 1.
Cu	1.70x-01 0.90000000000000000000000000000000000
Cu	1.30E-04 9.997100E-01 2 1.70E-01 1.1200000E-01 3 5.57E-05 9.99970000E-01 3 2.15E-04 9.9924000E-01 3 1.70E-04 7.9060000E-01 7 1.70E-04 9.9966000E-01 2 1.70E-01 9.9966000E-01 3
Cu	1.08F01 1.12000006F03 W 2.18F04 9.9970006F11 7 2.18F04 9.9970006F01 7 1.70F401 7.9060006F01 9 1.70F401 1.9060006F01 2 4.28F03 9.9960006F01 4
Cu	1.18F64 9.99140066F11 1.70F401 7.90000006F01 9 7.08F64 9.99140006F01 9 1.70E401 1.01000006F01 9
Cu	1.70ke01 7.900000001-04 9.700000001-04 9.700000001-01 9.7000000001-01 9.7000000001-01 9.7000000001-01 9.7000000001-01 9.7000000001-01 9.70000000001-01 9.7000000001-01 9.70000000001-01 9.70000000001-01 9.70000000001-01 9.70000000001-01 9.70000000001-01 9.70000000001-01 9.70000000001-01 9.700000000001-01 9.700000000001-01 9.70000000000001-01 9.70000000000001-01 9.70000000000001-01 9.700000000000000001-01 9.7000000000000000000000000000000000000
2 4 7.08F+04 9 9 9 9 1 7.08F+04 9 9 9 1 7.08F+05 9 1 7.08F+05 9 1 7.08F+05 9 9 1 7.08F+05 9	7.0aE+04 9.99760008-01 2 1.70E+01 1.03000008E-03 9 4.25E+05 9.99960008E-01 4
Cu	1.70K+01 1.03000000K+03 9
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C. C	
C	2.436+04 B.
2 3 99897 99897 1.70E+01 1 1	# #0-4000000000000 # #0+861.5
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1 2 89914 89914 1.708401 8 2 4 17 1.008401 9 2 3 89897 89897 1.708401 1 4 4 4.258405 9 60 1.708461 1	6 · 1.96E+04 9.99140000E-01 6
2 4 17 1.008+05 9 2 3 99897 99897 1.008+05 1 3 4 4 4.258+05 1 6 6 1.708+01 1	4 1.76E+01 8.60000000E-04 9.9
4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4 4	1.00E+03 9.99830000E-01 1
1 1 0 0 1.70K+01 1 1 2 0 0 1.70K+01 1	- 1 - 10E+01 1 - 03000000E-03
7 10+90/-7 0 0 0 7 1	TO HOUSE SAME A
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2 1 1 1.702+06 9	70T+06 9 9990000T+01 1
706+01 1	70E+01 1.0000000E+00 0
2 1 0 0 1.708+01 1	1.00000000E+00
,	1.000000001
2 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1.708+04 9.0000008-01 1.00000008-05

System Reliability

SINULATION RESULTS

Simulation name: M77

Bumber of simulation runs: Janoo.

Bumber of simulation runs: Janoo.

Bumber of monitored primitives: 69

Bandom number seed: 12345

=	LIMITIVE	DESCR.	TRANSITION	TRANSITION AND MODE	DE DESCRIPTION
2	HAME		TYPE	FROM MODE (NO/MAME)	
~	2		failure	1 p1	+ feil
			control	1 p1	2 ph2
			fallure	2 ph2	4 tail
			control	2 ph2	3 ph 3
			failure		4 6411
~	2		feilure	1.9.1	f fail
			control	1 91	2 ph2
			far luce		4 (41)
			control	2 ph2	J ph 3
			failure	3 ph3	4 6411
-	7		failur.	1 p1	4 fail
			control	1 p1	2 ph2
			feilure	2 ph2	4 6411
			control	2 ph2	J ph 3
			failure.	J ph3	4 fail
'n	1		failure	1 10 1	4 1411
			control	1 21	2 ph 2
			failure.	2 gh2	4 6011
			control	1,000	3 ph3
			Cas lure	3 ph.3	£ 6412
•	3		Callure		4 6011
			control	11.	2 ph2
			£411uc.	2 5n2	4 6411
			Confrol	2 582	J oh?
			Ca1115	J. th.	4 fail
	, ,		threshold	d.	2 down
	ב		failure	16.	4 6411
			control	1 91	2 ph 2
			Cat luce	2 642	4 6611
			control	2 ph2	3 ph 3
			failure	3 503	1194
2	70		failure	1 91	4 £411
			control	1 p1	2 ph 2
			feilure	2 ph2	f tail
			control	2 ph2	3 ph 3
			fatlure	3 ph3	+ fail
•	2		Colluce	1 61	t tail
			CONTROL	74	2 ph 2
			TALLET.		4 8011
			Control		3 683
			EAL Luce		4 6611
2	7		Callur.	101	4 toil
			control		2 ph 2
			failur.	å	4 8013
			control	2 ph2	J ph)
,			failure	3 ph3	4 2411
•	ž		failure	1 91	4 641
			control	1 p1	2 ph2


| 17 | December | Control
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| Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Control | Cont
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	3 1.33£+03 4 2.20£+02	4.32451868E+00 6.11383247E+00	1044	4.43558822E-01 7.34826965E-02	5.56441178E-01 9.26517303E-01	8.95600000E-01
23 trsa	1 2.76E+03 2 2.40E+02	5.41164928E+00 5.41164928E+00	2476	9.20062745E-01 7.99372551E-02	7.99372549E-02 9.20062745E-01	7.52400000E-01
24 cu	1 9.62E+02 2 4.56E+02 3 1.33E+03 4 2.53E+02	1.54415619E+00 1.37607050E+00 4.63609123E+00 7.12944126E+00	10000 9249 341	3.20744047E-01 1.52143301E-01 4.42801277E-01 8.43113762E-02	6.79255953E-01 8.47856699E-01 5.57198723E-01 9.15688624E-01	0.000000008+00 7.510000008-01 9.65900008-01 1.00000008+00
25 cu	1 9.64E+02 2 4.59E+02 3 1.34E+03 4 2.41E+02	1.52982128E+00 1.34237897E+00 4.54069996E+00 6.99143887E+00	10000 9294 316	3.21170285E-01 1.52934296E-01 4.45631350E-01 8.02640702E-02	6.78829715E-01 8.47065704E-01 5.54368650E-01 9.19735930E-01	0.000000000000000000000000000000000000
26 cu	1 9.62E+02 2 4.58E+02 3 1.33E+03 4 2.52E+02	1.54186285E+00 1.35410321E+00 4.64057398E+00 7.09613419E+00	10000 9266 158	3.20026055E-01 1.52601893E-01 4.42649471E-01 8.38821819E-02	6.79173945E-01 8.47398107E-01 5.57310129E-01 9.16117818E-01	0.00000000000000 7.340000000E-02 9.642000000E-01 1.000000000E+00
27 cu	1 9.64E+02 2 4.58E+02 3 1.33E+03 4 2.45E+02	1.50045624E+00 1.34978E31E+00 4.56795547E+00 7.01308060E+00	10000 9283 320	3.213603828-01 1.526725618-01 4.443742008-01 8.15928579E-02	6.78639618E-01 8.47327439E-01 5.55625400E-01 9.18407142E-01	0.000000000E+00 7.17000000E-02 9.68000000E-01 1.0000000E+00
28 cu	3 9.642+02 2 4.575+02 3 1.335+03 4 2.505+02	1.50240636E+00 1.36641634E+00 4.6+934492E+00 7.07723186E+00	10000 9262 309	3.213139315-01 1.522831595-01 4.42961.675-01 8.344144375-02	6.78686069E-01 8.47716841E-01 5.57038533E-01 9.1655856E-01	0.000000000E+00 7.38000000E-02 9.69100000E-01 1.00000000E+00
29 cu	1 9.012402 2 4.572402 3 1.332403 4 2.522402	1.57503629E+00 1.36640370E+00 4.64031267E+00 7.14738512E+00	10000 9250 320	3,234342615-01 1,524644212-31 4,43_613179-01 8,399431-1-32	6.73565639E-01 3.47595579E-01 5.56338183E-01 3.16000597E-01	0.000000000E+30 7.50000036E-02 9.68000000E-31
30 cu	2 4.53±02 2 4.53±02 3 2.33±5±03 4 2.42±03	1.52901268E+00 1.33844626E+00 4.54614353E+00 7.03021267E+00	1000u 9275 328	3.2133, 423-31 1.5363-830-31 4.452339372-31 8.08527313-32	5.78398338E-01 3.46963350E-01 5.54701013E-01 9.1337298E-01	0.000000000E+33 7.25000000E-02 9.67200000E-01 1.00000000E+0
37 cu	1 9.032+02 2 4.57E+02 3 1.33E+03 4 2.51E+02	1.518159875700 1.36379790E+00 4.63058519E+00 7.08085918E+00	10000 9252 346	3.210331315-01 1.524149652-01 4.42768739E-01 8.37581052E-02	0.78961809E-01 4.47585035E-01 5.57211261E-01 9.16241895E-01	0.000000000E+30 7.44000000E-02 9.65400000E-01 1.00000000E+00
30 cu	1 9.64E+02 2 4.60E+02 3 1.34E+03 4 2.39E+02	1.513169298+00 1.326126588+00 4.531942848+00 6.936446198+00	10000 9303 340	3.21464161E-01 1.53291809E-01 4.45704608E-01 7.95394224E-02	6.78535839K-01 8.46708191K-01 5.54295392K-01 9.20460578K-01	0.000000000000000000000000000000000000
39 cu	1 9.64E+02 2 4.59E+02 3 1.33E+03 4 2.43E+02	1.52026033E+00 1.33852327E+00 4.56026030E+00 6.9869593E+00	10000 9295 360	3.21253463E-01 1.53023301E-01 4.44727940E-01 8.09950966E-02	6.78746337E-01 8.46976699E-01 5.55272060E-01 9.19004903E-01	0.0000000000000 7.050000000000 9.640000000000 1.000000000000000
no 0+	1 9.65£+02 2 4.59£+02 3 1.33£+03 4 2.43£+02	1.48422074E+00 1.33838379E+00 4.57161856E+00 6.95500088E+00	10000 9291 361	3.21674207E-01 1.52985469E-01 4.4434088E-01 8.0994368E-02	6.78325793E-01 8.47014531E-01 5.55659112E-01 9.19000563E-01	0.00000000E+00 7.99000000E-02 9.63900000E-01 1.00000000E+00

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	2 4.58E+02	1.350356256+00	166	1.527547305-01	10-302261701	7.270000000E-02
	~	6.99804306£+00	•	6.16133455E-02	9.18386655E-01	1.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
					•	
70 ~	1 9.626+02	1.553897988+00	10000	3.20792327E-01	6.79207673E-01	0.00000000E+00
		1.352626400	5 9 5	10-201016076.1	6.4/3619542-01	7.31000060E-02
	٠,	4.622300625+UQ	•	4.4.6293b0E-01	3.3/1/0640E-01	9 - 9 2 2 0 0 0 0 E - 0 1
	70+316.7	00+360066/80.7	-	70-3780705/6.8	3.1845975E-01	1.000000000000000
20	1 9.63E+02	1.53779459E+00	10000	3.21007486E-01	6.78992514E-01	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
	2 4.58E+02	1.35428834E+00		1.52647866E-01	8.47352134E-01	7.28000000E-02
		4.57632542E+00		4.44676674E-01	5.55323326E-01	9.68600000E-01
	4 2.456+02	7.04379968E+00		4.16679736E-02	9.18332026E-01	1.00000000E+00
3	1 9 615402	00-39998668 1	9000	1 211267268-01	10.745545 3	00+400000000000000000000000000000000000
	2 4.588+02	1.345357306+00	9285	1.52737323E-01	8.47262677E-01	7.15000000000000000000000000000000000000
	3 1.33£+03	4.548569168+00	370	4.43609988E-01	5.56390012E-01	9.630000008-01
	4 2.482+02	7.02944613E+00	•	8.25269623E-02	9.17473038E-01	1.00000000E+00
a c	. 9 6 1840	00439676868 1	9000	10-25044405	10-210111105 3	001110000000000000000000000000000000000
;	2 4.57E+02	1.369759688+00	970	1.522479005-01	6.47712100E-01	7 4 10000000
	· ~	4.64062977E+00	334	4.42864675E-01	5.57135325E-01	9 . 66 200000E-01
		7.11294935E+00	•	6.39787280E-02	9.16021272E-01	1.0000000E+00
:			•			
7.11		1.492304335+00	_	3.217429805-01	6.78257020E-01	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
	70+300.4 7	0.10.4.50176.1	+ : :	10-3661996661	10-3/16/1001.4	20-300000000000000000000000000000000000
		6. 88373333356.00		7.435771706-02	9.2164273335-01	1.000000000001
	•				•	
יים מיי		1.564524542433	10000	J. 20634408E-01	6. 793655325-31	0.0000000000.00
	2 4.57E+02	1.365737232430	7 9 7	1.52353085E-01	8.47646915E-31	7.36000000E-02
	3 1.335+03	4.640434.00403 3.1036044004.0	? ?	1.450611228-01	5.36.364.46.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.40.	3.0630000000000000000000000000000000000
	•	200	•		10-30-00-00-0	
**	1 9.035.02	1.5.3241. 2	-	3.20909948-01	6.730330168-11	0.30c30000E+00
	2 4.575+02	1.35000000000000000000000000000000000000	^	1.52474097E-01	8.47525303E-01	7.373000002-02
	4 2.476+02	7. 365003 (12-2)	9 0	8.22236952E-02	9.17763358-01	1.3000000000000000000000000000000000000
i	•					
,	2 4 608402	1.30(323	0000	1.21013644E-01	6. 19130356E-01	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
	3 1.345+03	4.54451370E+00	362	4.45136344E-01	5.54863656E-01	9.63800000K-01
	4 3.40E+03	6.93558884E+00	•	8.00621248E-02	9.19937875E-01	1.000000000001
70 1	1 9.648+02	1.51167059E+00	10000	3.21172813E-01	6.788271878-01	0.0000000000000000000000000000000000000
	2 4.54E+02	1.355286968+00	9271	1.526637838-01	8.47316217E-01	7.29000000E-02
	→ '	4.565724858+00	325	4.44788207E-01	5.55211793E-01	•
	70+915.7	1.01/1//304+00	•	70-36/816661.0	7 · 7 1 6 4 4 8 0 3 E - 0 7	00+200000000·1
94	1 1.178+00	3.43019247E-01	9	3.91524552E-04	9.99604475E-01	1.000000000001
		3.43019247E-01	7.7	9.996084758-01	3.91524552E-04	9.9790000E-01
9 t	1 2.408+02	5.41168928E+00	•	7.99172551E-02	9.20062745E-01	1 . 00000000 E+00
	3 3.762+03	5.41168928E+0C	3476	9.20062745E-01	7.99372549E-02	7.52400000K-01
gt	1 0.002+00	0.0000000000000	•	0.00000000E+00	1.000000000001	1.000000008+00
	2 3.00E+03	0.0000000000.0	0	1.0000000E+00	0.0000000000000	1.00000000 T+00

76 gt			5.41592741E+00		8.02341543E-02	9.19765446E-01 1.0000000E+00
	7	2.765+03	6.41592741E	+00 2492	9.19765846E-01	8.023415418-02 7.50800600E-01
PRINITIVE	~		NON	KEAN TIME	RELIABILITY	UNRELIABILITY
2 4E	2 ~	OCCURROS	2000	3.21E+04	9.065000008-01	9.35000000K-02
		2 9065	•	3.316+03	9.35000000E-02	9.0650000K-01
	~	121		3.648+04	9.17600000E-01	8.24000000K-02
	~ ~	1 6241	8241	3.648+03	1.75900000E-01	6.24100000E-01
				3.248+04	9.075000000-01	20000000000000000000000000000000000000
		9075	•	3.31E+03	9.25000000E-02	9.07500000E-01
	~	998		3.466+04	9.13400000E-01	8.6600000E-02
	~	B 209	•	3.65E+03	1.79100000E-01	8.2090000E-01
	-		9 20	3.45E+04	9.1300000000-01	8.700000E-62
1	• ~	2 9067	•	3.315+03	9.3300000000	10-100000000 G
	~	661 +		3.342+04	9.10100000E-01	8.9900000E-02
	~	1918	•	3.67E+03	1.83200002-01	8.168000008-01
:		F 6 6	6.0	3.365+04	9.107000000000	8.930000001-02
***	•	90106	•	3 338+03	9 81000000E-02	201900000000000000000000000000000000000
	. ~	4 117		3.675+04	9.1830000E-01	8.1700000E-02
	~	3 6202	•	3.66E+03	1. 793000006-01	8.2020000E-01
	<u>.</u>	142		3.565+04	9.158000001-01	8.4200000E-02
74	 -	979	979	3.068+04	9.0213030002-01	9.7900000E-02
	- ~	1206 7		3.515+04	9.145000000000	8.550000001.02
	~	1 6166	•	3.67E+03	1.53+333333E-01	8.1660000E-01
	~	7 997	•	3, 415+04	9.11300000011.6	8.810000002-02
	<u></u> .	2 21		1.43E+06	9.973.0000.e.e.	2.10000000E-03
70 71	- -	518 518 5	21.5	5.78E+04	10-00000000000000000000000000000000000	5.19000000E-02
	• ~	1971		2.056+05	9.45+3003305-03	1 - 4600000E-61
	~	9335	•	1.215+03	6.65000001E-02	9.3350000E-01
	~	1338	-	2.98E+34	\$.33233332-31	1.00800000001
1.3 BE	٦.	173		6.348+04	9.5273333335-31	1.730000002-02
	- -	2557	1766	1.155+03	50-31010001.t	9.52700000E-03
	. ~	7016	•	3.19E+03	5.35000000E-02	# 1 0000000 of . 4
	_	1 983		3.05E+04	9.017393332-01	9.8300000E-02
14 Pu		439		6.83E+0+	9.5010000105-01	4.39000000E-02
		2 9561	o .	3.14E+03	4.3900000000-02	9.56100000E-01
	~ ^	109	109	2.758+05	9.89100000E-01	1.0900000H:02
	. ~	1013		2.96E+04	6.98700000E-01	1.01300001-01
15 be		176		6.305+04	9.52400000E-01	4.7600000K-02
		3 9524	•	1.15E+03	4 . 76000000E-02	9.52400000E-01
	~	105		2.86E+05	9 . 89500000E-01	1.050000004-02
	~ -	3 9419	9419	3.196+03	5.81000000E-02	9.419000008-01
, A 7.	•	207		701376.7	10-3000000101 a	17-4000000000000000000000000000000000000
	•	2 9521	•	3.156+03	4.190000006-02	9.52100000K-01
	~	125		2.40E+05	9.87500000E-01	1.2500000E-02
	~ .	3 9396	9336	3.198+03	6.04000000E-02	9.39600000E-01
1.7 bu	, -			5.04E+04	10-30000000 6 6	20-400000000 F
	. ~	9519	•	3.156+03	4.81000000E-02	9.519000008-01
	~	126	126	2.38E+05	9.87400000E-01	1 . 26000000K-62

	7	9393	9393	3.195+03	6.07000000E-02	9.393000001-01
	+	104	1044	2.87E+04	8.95600000E-01	1.0440000B-01
23 traa	~	2476	2476	. 21E+0	2 4 D D D D D E	2000009
54 cu	-	151	151	9110	9 . 2 4 9 0 0 0 0 0 E - 0 1	. 51000000E
	~ .	9249	9249	245+0	2100000015	9.24900000E-01
	~ ^	977	977	1.53E+05	9.7/400000E-01	2 . 2 & G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G G
	• ~	341	341		290000E-0	41000000
25 cu	-	106	306	4.258+04	29400000E-0	.060000000
	~	9594	9294	3.238+03	9	29400
	~	229	529	1.318+05		2900000E-0
	~ -	C 0 0 0	6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	3.318+03	9.35000000E-02	
	• •	9 7		2 3	9.000000E-01	
77.87	- ^	9266	95.6	3.248+03	7.34000000E-02	0-30000099
	· ~	229	229	: =	77100001-0	29000000
	~	9037	9037	2	\$ 300000E	.03700006
	~	354	354	8.38E+04	9.6420000E-01	3
37 cu	-	717	717	•	0 300000E-0	.1700000E-
	~ .	6 2 8 3	9 2 8 3	23E+0	7.1700000000-02	9.26300000000
	•	157	9 7 7	1.265+05	0-10000079	9
	~ ~		•	3.344403	70-1000000000	10-10-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-0
20 cu	• •	738	738	6	2 5	7.380000000000
	. ~	9262	8926	-	3400000000	26203000E-
	~	512	5 7 2	1.22E+05	55000008	2000000F
	~	9017	9017	Ξ.	°	0170000E-
	•	309	309		910000016	300000006
7. 67	-	753	753	1.005+04	\$000000E-0	202020
	~	9250	257.6	72+7	7.50000000E-02	. 25:300
	~ *	~ .	757	1.358+05	9.778000000000000	2.226697638-62
	•	9 7 6		3.122+03	9.72000000E-02	9.02333333339.9
7 : 01		22.5	, ,	1 1 1 1 1 1	3000000	
		9275		238+0	25000000002	4.27500:00E-01
	~	202	202	1.498+05		•
	~	9673	1373	. 312+0	9.27000000E-02	9.0730000008-01
	~	en (1	9.15E+04		3.263003358-32
7,	. .	97 4 1: 0	73 7	1.016+04	9.25200000E-01	70-200000000000000000000000000000000000
	• •	• •		1.316+05	7500000E-0	25.000.000.00
	~	9027	1327	32E+0		300.0010
	~	346	3+6	8.67E+04	400000E-0	16000000
38 cu	- (697	697	4.308+04	9.3030000E-01	•
	~ .	2016	707	3.225+03	9 9	300000000000000000000000000000000000000
	• -	0000	777	1 105+03		70-110-00-00-00-0
	• ~	340	0 7 7	8 . 82E+04	0-10000009	3 - 400000000000000000000000000000000000
39 cu	-	705	705	4.268+04	Ň	200000050
	7	9 2 9 5	9 5 9 5	3.238+03	7.0500000E-02	9.2950000B-01
	~	222	222	1.358+05	9.77800000E-01	. 220000002
	~	9073	9073	:	0-3000000	7300006
	.	360	360		9.6400000E-01	3.600000000
7U 07	- ^		200	4.235+04	0-M00000167	. 090000000
	4 ~	7676	1676	3.235+03		
	• ~	9074	9074	1. 11 K+01	9.26000000E-02	• •
	•	361	161	8.31E+04	390000E-0	61000000E-
41 cu	+	127	727	4.13E+04		2700000B
	7	9273	9273	1.248+03	1.27000000E-02	9.27300000E-01



SIMULATION RESULTS

Simulation name: BUT Number of simulation runs: 500000 Single iun duration: 17.00000 Number of monitored primitives: 13 Pandom number seed: 12345

PRINITIVE DESCR.	FRANSITION	TRANSITION AND NODE DESCRIPTION			
	1		TO CHIEF HO CALED		
.,	1101173	74 1	1101		
	1 1 1 1 1 1 1	1 0 1	2 Fn?		
	:allut-	2 ph 2	. 2011		
	Senttol	, ph2	3 5.42		
	£81141 =	, Fh.	1 4 4 1 1		
200	failure	1 51	: 6011		
	control	1 41	2 ph2		
	(atlat-	; ph2	4 (41)		
	control	2 ph?	3 ph3		
	farlure	J ph J	4 6411		
74 •	fatlure	1 p1	4 feil		
	control	i pi	2 ph2		
	failure	2 ph2	1 6411		
	control	2 ph2	3 ph3		
	failura	3 ph3	foil		
5 bu	feilure.	1 91	t feil		
	control	1 p1	2 ph2		
	feilure	2 ph2			
	control	2 ph2	3 ph3		
	failure	3 ph3	fer?		
9	failur	1 01	4 Cail		
	contro	101	2 oh 2		
	failure	2 ph2	4 6411		
	control	2 ph2	3 ph3		
	failure	3 ph3	1 6011		
7 P.C	failure	1 91	4 6011		
	control	1 p1	2 ph2		
	failure	2 ph2	4 feil		
	control	2 ph2	3 ph3		
	failure	3 ph3	4 6411		
	threshold	1 cp	2 down		
14 gt	control	1 one	2 two		
	control	2 two	l one		
PRIMITIVE	HODE AVERAGE	STANDARD	WORLD AVAILABILITY	CHAVATLARILITY	RELIABILITY
NO NAKE					
2 Pu	1.00	0	500000 5.68092249E-01	4.11907751E-01 0	0.000000000000000
	2 5.00E+00				3.1800000E-04
	3 2.008+00	7.45570651E-05		_	9.99828000K-01
	4 6.80E-03	3.95220966E-04			1.00000000E+00
74 6	1 1.008+01				0 ' 00000000 + 00
	2 S.00E+00				5.34000000K-04
	3 2.002+00	7.53794156E-05		-	9.99646000E-01
	4 7.25E-03	4.16279603E-04	0 4.26261840E-04	9.995737388-01 1	1.00000000C+00
ì		1 612517158-04 600	10-700000000000000000000000000000000000	0 10-417011011 7	***************
	2 5.005+00				4 . 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8

	•	;								
	n +	2.00E+00 6.58E-03		7.24345955E-05 3.95668176E-04		30	1.17566341E-01 3.87207649E-04	6.82433659E-01 9.99612792E-01		9.998200000K-01
s bu	N M	1.00E+01 5.00E+00 2.00E+00		1.61377764E-04 1.66262995E-04 7.61544434E-05	-04 500000 -04 499752 -05 75		5.88090459E-01 2.93945311E-01 1.17558547E-01	4.11909541E-017.06054689E-01	0 - 0	1.96000000E+00 4.9600000E+00 9.99860000E-01
7 9	*	6.90K-03 1.00K+01 5.00K+00 2.00K+00		3.98319709E-04 1.82118878E-04 1.68140599E-04 7.42727570E-05				9.99594317E-01 4.11913904E-01 7.06054016E-01 6.82437342E-01		1.000000000000000000000000000000000000
3 A	* ~~~*	5.00E+01 5.00E+01 5.00E+00 2.00E+00 6.24E-03		4.01370256E-04 1.74410467E-04 1.58435956E-04 7.06885912E-05 3.82894854E-05	5000		6.05262036E-04 5.88098351E-01 2.93963563E-01 1.17571213E-01 3.66873260E-04	9.9994748601 4.11901649E-01 7.06036437E-01 8.82428747E-01 9.99633127E-01		1.6000000E+00 6.0000000E+00 4.6400000E-04 9.9988600E-01
13 tres	-~	1.70E+01 6.22E-05		2.90046773E-0	. o. s		9.99996341E-01			9.99986000E-01
14 96	~	1.732+01		2.90346773E-05 2.30046773E-05	-05	0 r	3.65930725E-06 9.99996341E-01	9.99996341E-01 3.65930726E-06		1.00000000E+00 9.99986000E-01
BUILIKING	195N		, YO	NON-ZERO	MEAN TIME	u X	RELIBELLITY	UNRELIABILITY	111	
NO NAME	o: - •	10 000	25000000	RUNS 259	3.28E+04		n-3;:r28466.6		¥0-:	
	.4 *	~	117111	111665	1.70E+01		5.13000000000000000000000000000000000000	1 3.33432000E-0:	10-01	
	. ~			19967			9.1400.0.000		10-3	
	•		9	90	9.845.0		3.333.34.72-31		10-3	
7 0 0	••		1.5.	767	3.18E+0:			F0-300000000 5 3	7 -	
	۰ ۳		7.0	439733	1.376+05		0-9-4-0-10-0-10-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0-0		10-0	
	~		173571	119661	1.765+01		6.5363333	•	10-2	
14	m -	- -	, ,		1.10E+05		10-30-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00-00	1 1.540000000E-04	0 0	
	•		951661	499756	1.705+01		4.8800000E-0		-01	
	~		5.5	\$5	1.55E+05	50	9.99890000E-01	-	10-3	
	~ ~		499701	198701	1.70E+01	5 6	5.98000000000000000000000000000000000000	9.99402000E-01	10-1	
d A	٠.		7	2 2	3.43E+04	: :	9.99504000E-01	• •	0 -	
	-		499752	499752	1.70E+01	10	4.96000000E-04	•	10-3	
	~ -	•	68	69	9.558+04	3 3	9.998226608-01	1.74000000E-04	70-5	
	• •		75	75	1.136+05	1 0	*0-300000\$#66.6	n -	10-	
74			762	262	3.248+04	•	9.99476000E-01	•	10-3	
	- ·		199738	499738	1.70E+01		5.24000000E-04	•	-07	
	٠,٠		499679	629667	1. 70E+01		6.42000000E-0	10-10000000000000000000000000000000000	70-3	
		-	2		1.048+05	S	9.998360008-01	-	10-3	
7 0	⊶ -		232	232	3.66E+04	•	9.995360005-01	1 4.640000000E-04	* O - U	
	→ ~		63	63	1.35E+05	4 6	9.99874000E-01	n	10-0	
	~		199705	499705	1.70E+01	10	5.90000000E-04	•	10-3	
	•	-	57	57	1.49E+05	60	9.99886000E-01	-	¥0-3	
13 Crss		~ .	r (۰.	1.21E+06	•	9.99986000E-01	1 1.400000000E-05	500	
26 11	- ~	٧	, ~	, ~	1. /0E+01 1.21E+06		1 . 00000000E+00	- ·	50-3	
						•		•		
						J 1	System Reliability	liability		

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Simulation name: BUT Mumber of simulation cuns: 1000000 Single run duration: 10.00000 Mumber of monitored primitives: 13 Random number seed: 12345

D/HAME) TO MODE(HO/HAME)						240 ~		240					1 (4)	2 ph2	t fail	3 ph3	4 (41)	4 fail	2 ph 2	+ fas:			2 262			4 6611	2 down	2 640	l one	-		499 9.99743365E-01 2.56635154E-04 9		1 00+8000000001	E-04 0 2.56635156g-04 9.99743365g-01 1.00000000g+00	E-04 512 9.99747463E-61 7.52597236E-04 9.99488000E-01	0 0.0000000K+00 1.0000000K+00	E+00 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0	E-04 0 2.52597231E-04 9.997474034-01 1.00000000E+00
FROM MODE(NO/NAME)	1	, A	7 to 1				2 ph2	2 ch2	. 4d	10	 1	 203	. d.	. :).	10.31	200	, u ;	1 51	.a .	7 26 7	7 bu 7			2 ph2	2 ph2	3 ph3	٠ 	1 one	2 two	STANDARD	DEVIATION	1.311027016-04	0.0000000E+00	0 . 00000000E+00	1.311027016-04	1.29692460E-04	0.000000000000	0.000000000000	 1.296924605-04
TYPE	917101	101100		1011409	0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1	100110	failure	Control			7013403	Seilure Seilure	Callure	control	failure	control	Caslure.	failure	control	Carluce	Control	6 1 2 7 7 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8 8		Zailura Zailura	Control	Cailure	threshold	control	control	Ā	HO TIME	1 1.008+01	2 0.00E+00	3 0.00E+00	4 2.57E-03	1 1.008+01	2 0.00E+00	3 0.00E+00	 4 2.53K-03
NO NAME													, ; ;									; ;					13 tras	14 gt		PRIMITIVE	HO NAME	2 pr				100			

	m ¥	9 4	0.00E+00	000	0 -	0.00000000E+00	6781	E+00 E-04	.,	0 4	. 562	0000	0.000000000E+00 2.56281665E-04	9.99	1.00000000E+00 9.99743718E-01		1.00000000E+00	
2 4	- N N P		1.00E+01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.60E-03	700 F	-00-	1,32352245E-04 0,00000000E+0 0,00000000E+0 1,32352245E-04	2451 0001 2451	7007 0000 1++1	v.	8000	0000	0000	9.99740104E-01 0.00000000E+00 0.0000000E+00	1.00	2.59896407E-04 1.00000000E+00 1.00000000E+00 9.99740104E-01	-	9.99492000E-01 1.00000000E+00 1.00000000E+00	
3 4		4004	1.00E+01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00 2.47E-03	100 m		1,28915257E-04 0,00000000E+00 0,0000000E+00 1,28915257E-04	257 000 000 157	0000	•	*000	0000	5309 0000 0105	9.99753099E-01 0.00000000E+00 0.00000000E+00	2.46 1.00 1.00 9.99	2.46901055E-04 1.00000000E+00 1.0000000E+00	•	9.99516000E-01 1.00000000E+00 1.0000000E+00	
3 A C		- 667	1.00E+01 0.00E+00 0.00E+00	000		1.27863139E-04 0.00000000E+00 0.00000000E+01	0000	+ 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 + + 1	2000	8000	997	9789 0000 0000	9.99745932E-01 0.000000000E+00 0.00000000E+00 2.54068468E-04	2.54 1.00 1.00 9.99	2.540684662-04 1.00000000E+00 1.00000000E+00		9.99481000E-01 1.000000000E+00 1.00000000E+00	
13 trss	- ~	~ .	1.00E+01 9.46E-06	10+	• •	6.70271584E-06 6.70271584E-06	5841	90-1		~ 0	191	9905	10-351180191	9.46	9.46408415E-07 9.99999054E-01		9.99994000E-01	- 0
14 gt	-~	œ ~;	9.40E-06 1.03E+31	45.	9 9	6.70271584E-06	584	90-1	J.,	9 4	198	3905	9.16;38115E-07 9.39939054E-01	97.6	9.99999054E-01 9.46408415E-07		1.00000000E+00 9.99993000E-01	o -
PRIMITIVE SALVE ON	re or	TRANS.		TOTAL NO		NON-ZERO	2ERO	-	SKIT KASM		54 56 65	1981	RELLABILITY	ä	UNRELIABILITY	11.		
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